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Arbitration/Litigation Interface: The European
Debate
By Margaret Moses*
Abstract: In recent years, there has been a debate in the European
Union over the need to provide a transparent and predictable
interface between international arbitration and cross-border
litigation. That debate has recently culminated in the issuance of the
Recast Brussels Regulation (the Recast), effective January 10, 2015.
However, the Recast has not provided a method to accomplish this
interface because it does not prevent parallel proceedings. Parallel
proceedings occur when a party that had agreed to arbitrate
nonetheless goes to court while the other party proceeds with
arbitration. These parallel proceedings undermine the effectiveness of
arbitration because of increased cost, inefficiency, and delay, as well
as the high risk of inconsistent judgments. Because of the global
impact of international commercial arbitration, the significance of the
European decision echoes beyond its borders. This Article discusses
the background leading to the Recast, interpretive issues arising from
the Recast—particularly in light of the explanatory Recital 12 found in
the preamble to the Recast—as well as the need for a harmonized
consensus on preventing parallel proceedings. It concludes by
proposing various means for encouraging flexible solutions to the
problem.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past few years, there has been extensive controversy in Europe
about how international commercial arbitration should interface with
litigation. For litigated matters, the Brussels I Regulation (Brussels I, the
Brussels I Regulation, or the Regulation) deals with the jurisdiction of
courts and recognition and enforcement of judgments in the Member States
of the European Union.1 Arbitration, however, is excluded from the
Regulation’s regime.2 Arbitration was excluded from the original Brussels
Convention in 19683 because it was believed that the United Nations
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(the New York Convention)4 and the 1961 European Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration5 already sufficiently regulated
international commercial arbitration. Forty-six years later, however, it is
apparent that a number of issues are not governed either by the New York
Convention or the Brussels I Regulation.6 The latest efforts of the
European Union to deal with the arbitration/litigation interface are
contained in the recently promulgated Recast Brussels Regulation (the
Recast Regulation, Brussels Recast, or the Recast).7 Although the Recast
1
Council Regulation 44/2001, of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC) [hereinafter
Brussels I].
2
Id. art. 1(2)(d) (“The Regulation shall not apply to . . . arbitration.”).
3
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
1968 O.J. (L 299) 15 (EC), revised in 1978 O.J. (L 304) 77, revised in 1982 O.J. (L 388) 30. The
Brussels I Regulation has superseded the Brussels Convention.
4
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention]. The New York Convention requires
courts of contracting states to enforce both arbitral agreements (Article II) and awards (Article V). Id.
More than 150 countries are parties to the New York Convention. See Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958) (the “New York Convention”),
UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html
(last visited Oct. 11, 2014). One of the reasons for the growth of international commercial arbitration is
that awards are readily enforceable under the New York Convention because the grounds for nonenforcement are quite narrow. Basically, an award cannot be refused enforcement for a mistake of law
or fact by the arbitrator, but rather only if there was a defect in the integrity of the process.
5
Final Act of the Special Meeting of Plenipotentiaries for the Purpose of Negotiating and Signing a
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 349; see
also Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 13 [hereinafter the Jenard Report] (explaining the 1968 Brussels
Convention).
6
See infra Part IV.A.
7
Regulation 1215/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
(Recast), 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1 [hereinafter Brussels Recast]. Although the Brussels Recast was
published in the Official Journal, it will not apply until January 10, 2015. Id. The “recast” procedure is
one in which the only issues put forward by the Commission for review by other European Institutions
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clarifies some issues, it does not provide a transparent and predictable
interface between arbitration and cross-border litigation; thus, it does not
appear to prevent inefficient parallel proceedings8 with a high risk of
inconsistent judgments. Because of the global importance of international
commercial arbitration, the significant participation of the European Union
in international economic activity,9 and the increasing role of U.S. counsel
in international arbitrations,10 this Article addresses the major steps along
the way toward the Recast Regulation, the conflicting perspectives that
were considered, the result that was forged from the input of many different
stakeholders, the unresolved issues, and some possible solutions.
As global economic activity has increased, international commercial
arbitration has become the generally utilized means to resolve the inevitable
disputes that arise between parties to international contracts.11 The
are those that have been addressed by the Commission in its Proposal. Other issues can only be
discussed if the Commission agrees or if all Member States agree. See P.A. Nielsen, The State of Play
of the Recast of the Brussels I Regulation, 81 NORDIC J. OF INT’L L. 585, 587 (2012).
8
Parallel proceedings can occur in either litigation or arbitration when the same parties
simultaneously pursue the same dispute in two different venues. It occurs in litigation when the
respective parties begin actions on the same facts in two different jurisdictions. See NADJA ERK,
PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: A COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
16–24 (2014). With respect to arbitration, it occurs when one party begins an arbitration, while the
other files a lawsuit on the same facts in a different jurisdiction. See id. The issue of parallel
proceedings becomes quite complex under the Brussels Regulation because of the questions of how
enforcement will proceed and which laws will govern when there are inconsistent results between
arbitration awards and court judgments.
9
See The EU in the World - Economy and Finance, EUROSTAT, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
statistics_explained/index.php/The_EU_in_the_world_-_economy_and_finance (last visited Sept. 18,
2014) (“In 2010, world GDP was valued at EUR 47,570 billion . . . . The EU-27 accounted for a 25.8%
share of the world’s GDP in 2010, while the United States accounted for a 22.9% share.”).
10
Today, U.S. lawyers are involved in arbitrations in all parts of the world. It is not unusual to find
U.S. law firms involved on both sides of major international arbitrations in which neither the claimant
nor the respondent is a U.S. company. See generally Michael D. Goldhaber, Arbitration Scorecard, AM.
LAW., July 1, 2013. For example, in a $48 billion arbitration that is being arbitrated in London between
a Bahamas Company as the claimant and Swiss, Russian, and Jersey companies as respondents, the
claimant’s counsel is DLA Piper LLP (now a “global” firm, but with many U.S. lawyers) and the
respondent’s counsel includes Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Bryan Cave LLP. Id. Among treaty disputes,
in a $114 billion treaty arbitration, which is being arbitrated at the Hague and involving companies from
the Isle of Man and Cyprus versus the Russian Federation, claimant’s counsel is Shearman & Sterling
LLP and respondent’s counsel is Baker Botts L.L.P. and Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. Id.
Moreover, many large U.S. law firms have offices abroad that are representing European companies in
arbitrations held in Member States. Id. In a $4.8 billion controversy between a Finnish utility and a
Franco–German construction consortium being arbitrated in Stockholm, claimant’s counsel includes
Shearman & Sterling LLP and Baker & McKenzie and respondent’s counsel includes White & Case
LLP. Id. Many international commercial arbitrations are held in major arbitral centers such as London,
Paris, and Stockholm where they are subject to European law. Id. For these arbitrations, consideration
of the Recast Regulation reveals particular concerns and perspectives that Europeans bring to bear on
the interface between arbitration and litigation.
11
Understanding the parameters of the Recast Regulation can help counsel prepare for the impact
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concerns in Europe relating to the arbitration/litigation interface were based
in large part on the impact of parallel proceedings on the arbitration process
and the potential for inconsistent judgments.
Arbitration is attractive in part because the parties do not want to
resolve their disputes in the national court of the other party. Instead, they
agree to arbitrate. However, once a dispute arises, one party may
nonetheless commence an action in court (usually the court of its home
country). The other party pursues arbitration in the country the parties have
chosen as the seat of the arbitration (usually a neutral third country). The
parallel proceedings that result are highly undesirable because of the cost,
inefficiency, and delay they cause and because of the risk that inconsistent
decisions will result. The party bringing the action in court may have a
legitimate reason to challenge the validity of the arbitration agreement, but
raising the issue in its home country court—rather than in the agreed-upon
arbitration forum—may also be a tactic to delay and harass the other party.
Under the New York Convention, courts are required to refer parties
who come before them challenging the validity of an arbitration agreement
to arbitration, unless the court finds that the arbitration agreement is “null
and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.”12 Nothing in the
Convention, however, deals with the timing or priority of individual courts
when deciding this issue.
One way to prevent parallel proceedings in arbitration is for the court
at the seat of arbitration to issue an anti-suit injunction. This is an order by
the court to the party refusing to arbitrate that it must discontinue the other
litigation.13 In common law countries, the courts are willing under certain
that the Recast will have on international commercial arbitration when it becomes effective in 2015.
Arbitration has an increasingly global scope in its application and practice. International caseloads of
the major international arbitral institutions nearly doubled between 1993 and 2003 and more than tripled
during the same period in the American Arbitration Association and its International Centre for Dispute
Resolution. See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL & RICHARD W. NAIMARK, TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 341 (2005). The European Union
and its twenty-eight Member States play a huge role in international commerce and, as a result, have a
significant impact on international commercial arbitration. Id. In light of this, United States businesses
and their counsel should understand the kinds of changes that will accompany the adoption and
application of the Brussels Recast Regulation.
12
New York Convention, supra note 4, art. II(3).
13
See, e.g., Quaak v. Klyveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren 361 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2004)
(enjoining one party from maintaining an action in Belgium in which it was asking the Belgian court to
impose penalties on any party seeking its records in Belgium). Anti-suit injunctions in arbitration may
also be sought in order to keep a party from vacating an award or from enforcing an award that has been
vacated. However, the kind of anti-suit injunction that is the focus of this Article is one to protect an
arbitration agreement and to prevent parallel proceedings. Anti-suit injunctions issued at the beginning
of a dispute to protect the tribunal’s jurisdiction are generally more favored than anti-suit injunctions
issued after the conclusion of the arbitration to prevent enforcement. See S.I. Strong, Border
Skirmishes: the Intersection Between Litigation and International Commercial Arbitration, 2012 J.
DISP. RESOL. 1, 14 (2012) (“[A]nti-suit injunctions sought at the beginning or in the middle of a legal
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circumstances to grant anti-suit injunctions.14 Courts in civil law countries,
however, typically do not grant anti-suit injunctions.15 In the European
Union, Member State courts are prohibited from issuing anti-suit
injunctions with respect to litigation under Brussels I.16 Moreover, under
Allianz SpA v. West Tankers Inc. (West Tankers or West Tankers 2009)17—a
controversial decision that will be discussed more fully below—that
prohibition was extended to arbitration, thereby banning a mechanism that
might otherwise limit the undesirable results of parallel proceedings.
In the past few years in Europe, there have been numerous discussions,
papers, proposals, and court decisions dealing with parallel proceedings and
arbitration.18 The concern in the European Union is that even though an
dispute would be presumptively permitted, to the extent that the injunction attempts to enjoin litigation
in favor of arbitration.”).
14
Anti-suit injunctions are used in both litigation and arbitration. In the United States, courts are
split on the proper standard for granting an anti-suit injunction. See Steven R. Swanson, Antisuit
Injunctions in Support of International Arbitration, 81 TUL. L. REV. 395, 412–15 (2006). The
“conservative” standard has been adopted by the District of Columbia, Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits
while the “liberal” approach has been endorsed by the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. Id. The
conservative approach to granting foreign anti-suit injunctions holds that granting the anti-suit
injunction would in essence bar a foreign court from hearing a claim, thereby causing serious
international comity implications. Id. The liberal approach is less concerned about international
comity, but rather focuses on whether the duplicative litigation is vexatious and creates unnecessary
additional costs or duplicative efforts. Id. Although all courts have concerns about comity and therefore
some reluctance to grant anti-suit injunctions, U.S. courts are somewhat more likely to grant injunctions
in arbitration than in litigation because of the strong federal policy favoring arbitration. See, e.g., Daniel
Rainier, The Impact of West Tankers on Parties’ Choice of a Seat of Arbitration, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
431, 452–53 (2010) (“[Mitsubishi] was certainly a strong indicator that parties with arbitration
agreements would be expected to honor them and compelled to do so if they did not. It is a logical
progression for courts to use equitable relief in the form of antisuit injunctions to enforce arbitration
agreements and to further the federal policy favoring arbitration.”).
15
See John J. Barcelo III, Anti-Foreign-Suit Injunctions to Enforce Arbitration Agreements, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS
2007 107 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2008) (“Civil law jurisdictions generally find anti-foreign-suit
injunctions offensive, even violative of international law.”).
16
Case C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. I-3565. However, a Member State, such as
England, could issue an anti-suit injunction against a party to an arbitration agreement that brought a
court action based on the same matters in a non-Member State court. Id.
17
Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663.
18
The extensive literature on this subject has been discussed by many commentators. See, e.g.,
Luca G. Radicati Di Brozolo, Arbitration and the Draft Revised Brussels I Regulation: Seeds of Home
Country Control and of Harmonisation?, 7 J. OF PRIV. INT’L L. 423, 423 n.1 (2011); see also Massimo
Benedettelli, Communitarization of International Arbitration: A New Spectre Haunting Europe?, 27
ARB. INT’L 583, 585 n.6 (2011); Martin Illmer, Brussels I and Arbitration Revisited, 75 RABELSZ BD.
645, 647 n.9 (2011); C. Kessedjian, Le Règlement 44/2001 et l’Arbitrage [Regulation 44/2001 and
Arbitration], 4 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE: BULLETIN DU COMITÉ FRANÇAIS DE L’ARBITRAGE [REVIEW OF
ARBITRATION: BULLETIN FROM THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF ARBITRATION] 699 (2009); C. Kessedjian,
The Proposed Arbitration Provisions in the Recast of Regulation 44/2001, in 2011 CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 202 (Arthur W.
Rovine ed., 2012).
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anti-suit injunction only enjoins the parties—not the foreign court—an
injunction ordering a party not to continue its lawsuit in a foreign court
interferes with that court’s jurisdiction.19 The European view is that an
anti-suit injunction prevents the foreign court from exercising its full power
to determine if it has jurisdiction and thereby impairs the mutual trust that
Member State courts owe to each other.20
A large part of the controversy has concerned whether or not
arbitration should be completely excluded from the Brussels I Regulation,21
meaning that the entire arbitral process—from the agreement to the award
and its consequences—will be outside the scope of the Regulation’s regime
governing jurisdiction of the courts and recognition and enforcement of
judgments. In an earlier case, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had
ruled that the Brussels Convention, the predecessor to the Regulation, did
not apply to cases in which arbitration was the principal subject matter of
the case (e.g., when the issue was the appointment of an arbitrator).22
The question remained, however, about the scope of the exclusion with
respect to other situations. In West Tankers 2009, the ECJ found that
despite the specific exclusion of arbitration in Article 1(2)(d), sometimes
arbitration would be governed by the Regulation.23 In that case, one party
was challenging in an Italian court the validity of an agreement to arbitrate
in London, and the English court issued an anti-suit injunction to require
the matter to be resolved in arbitration.24 However, according to the ECJ,
the anti-suit injunction was improper.25 In its view, the initial jurisdictional
question before the Italian court of whether there was a valid arbitration
agreement was incidental to the main claim—in this case a claim for tort

19
See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶ 28; see also Case
C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. I-3565, ¶ 27.
20
See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶ 30; see also Case
C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. I-3565, ¶ 28.
21
Brussels I, supra note 1.
22
See Case C-190/89, Marc Rich & Co. AG v. Società Italiana Impianti PA, 1991 E.C.R. I-03855
(ruling that proceedings for the appointment of an arbitrator are within the arbitration exclusion and thus
are not covered by the Brussels Convention). But cf. Case C-391/95, Van Uden v. Deco-Line, 1998
E.C.R. 1-07091 (deciding that certain interim procedures in a pending arbitration could fall under the
Brussels Convention for enforcement purposes).
23
See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663. At the time of West
Tankers 2009, the highest court in the European Union was known as the European Court of Justice (the
ECJ). See Information Brochures, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7004/ (last visited Sept.
18. 2014). That court is now known as the Court of Justice. Id. The Court of Justice of the European
Union (the CJEU) includes the Court of Justice, the General Court, and a specialized court, the Civil
Service Tribunal. Id. The Court of Justice is still sometimes informally referred to as the ECJ and all
references to it in this article will be to the ECJ.
24
See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶¶ 9-18.
25
See id. ¶¶ 28–32.
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damages.26 The ECJ found that because the tort claim was within the
Regulation, the “incidental” issue of the arbitration agreement’s validity
was also within the Regulation.27 In other words, the ECJ determined that
since the subject matter of West Tankers was the claim for tort damages—
the kind of substantive issue clearly covered by the Regulation—then the
question of the arbitration agreement’s validity was a preliminary issue
equally subject to the Regulation.28
Having reached this core conclusion, the ECJ then found that an antisuit injunction by the English Court to prevent the Italian court from ruling
on the arbitration agreement’s validity was incompatible with Brussels I
because it would strip the power of the Italian court to rule on its own
jurisdiction.29 To allow the practice would undermine the trust Member
States accord to one another’s legal system.30
The ECJ’s decision was not, in the view of many, consistent with the
exclusion of arbitration set forth in the Brussels I Regulation. Various
stakeholders have steadfastly supported complete exclusion of arbitration
from Brussels I in order for litigation and arbitration to operate under
separate legal frameworks.31 However, others have called for the deletion
of the arbitration exclusion from the Regulation or a partial deletion so that
arbitration and litigation would both be regulated by the same regime.32
Finally in 2012, after many proposals and counterproposals, the European
Parliament and the Council agreed upon the text of a revised Regulation
known as the Brussels I Recast.33 The Recast as finally adopted contains
some clarifications concerning how arbitration and litigation interface, but

26

See id. ¶ 26.
See id.
28
See id. Somewhat less clear is whether the Italian court’s decision on validity, which the ECJ
stated was within the scope of the Regulation, would also be enforceable as a judgment under the
Regulation’s regime. In a post West Tankers case, an English Court of Appeal said yes. Navigation Co.
v. Endesa Generacion SA, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1397 (Eng.). It held that a Spanish court’s ruling that
there was no valid arbitration clause was a judgment within the scope of Brussels I and was binding on
the English court. See infra text accompanying notes 83–90.
29
See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶¶ 26–28.
30
See id. ¶ 30.
31
The European Parliament, for example, supported complete exclusion of arbitration from Brussels
I. See Draft Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament, COM (2010) 748
final (June 28, 2011) [hereinafter Draft Report], available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
meetdocs/2009_2014/ documents/juri/pr/869/869709/869709en.pdf.
32
See, e.g., Burkhard Hess et al., Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member
States, at 49 (Sept. 2007) [hereinafter Heidelberg Report]; Commission Green Paper on the Review of
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, COM (2009) 175 final (Apr. 21, 2009) [hereinafter
Commission Green Paper].
33
See Brussels Recast, supra note 7. Although the Recast Regulation deals with a number of issues
besides arbitration, this Article will focus on its treatment of arbitration.
27
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it continues the complete exclusion of arbitration from the Recast
Regulation, leaving unresolved the problems of parallel proceedings and
inconsistent judgments.
Part II of this Article deals with the background leading to the Brussels
Recast, including problems and cases that preceded the ECJ’s decision in
West Tankers 2009, the content and scope of the decision, the controversy
provoked by the decision, and the EU Commission Proposal in 2010 to try
to resolve the controversy. Part III considers issues the Recast Regulation
may have resolved by means of the extensive explanatory provisions
contained in Recital 12 (Recital or Recital 12), as well as issues that remain
unresolved. Part IV focuses on problems that remain and possible solutions
going forward, both practical and aspirational. The need for solutions is
manifest because the current state of the law regarding parallel proceedings
in Europe appears to create as many issues as it resolves.
II. BACKGROUND LEADING TO THE RECAST BRUSSELS
REGULATION
The path leading to the Brussels Recast’s treatment of arbitration was
at best rocky.
The main question regarding the potential
arbitration/litigation interface was whether arbitration should be included in
the Recast at all. Should the camel’s nose be allowed under the tent? The
ECJ took the controversial step of saying yes in West Tankers 2009 when it
held that an anti-suit injunction in support of arbitration was not permitted
because it was incompatible with Brussels I. In response to many different
strong opinions by various groups regarding the ECJ’s decision, the EU
Commission undertook a compromise in its 2010 Proposal. Ultimately,
however, the Commission Proposal was rejected and the final Brussels
Recast came up with something else entirely, which will be discussed in
Part III.
A. Brussels I and the Italian Torpedo
Brussels I provides that once a Member State court is seised of a
litigated matter, no other Member State court may go forward with the
same matter until the first court has determined whether it has jurisdiction.34
34
The court first seised is the first court to receive the claim. The EU rules on jurisdiction give
priority to the court first seised. See Brussels I, supra note 1. Article 27 (1 & 2) provides:
1. Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties
are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the court first
seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of
the court first seised is established.
2. Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, any court other than the
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The result can be what Europeans call a “torpedo action,” which means that
a party with deliberate intent to delay may race to file the first suit in a
jurisdiction whose court system is notoriously slow.35 Because in some
cases the court first seised could take 10 years or more to reach a decision,
it effectively “torpedoes” any chance for a reasonable or timely resolution
of the dispute. The torpedo action is sometimes referred to as the “Italian
torpedo” because the Italian courts are known to be painfully slow and
inefficient.36 The court seised second cannot enjoin a party in its court to
discontinue the action in the inefficient first seised court because under
Brussels I it must respect the integrity of the other court to correctly decide
the jurisdictional question.37
The ECJ held in Turner v. Grovit that even when one party is acting in
bad faith by bringing a case in another jurisdiction in order to frustrate
existing proceedings, a court cannot issue an anti-suit injunction to stop the
bad faith party from maintaining the litigation in another court.38
According to the ECJ, an anti-suit injunction would limit the power of a
court to freely assess its own jurisdiction and thereby undermine the mutual
trust that the Member States accord one another’s legal systems and judicial
institutions.39 Thus, a court in one Member State cannot limit another
Member State court’s power to determine the dispute by enjoining the
parties from litigating before that court. Therefore, the ECJ established in
Turner that with respect to litigated matters, the Brussels I Regulation does
not permit anti-suit injunctions within the European Union.40
But what about anti-suit injunctions to protect arbitration rather than
litigation? One might think that the express exclusion of arbitration found
in Article 1(2)(d) of the Brussels I Regulation would mean that the
Regulation provided no authority to bar an injunction whose purpose was to
protect arbitration. However, in West Tankers 2009, the ECJ found that an
anti-suit injunction in support of arbitration was not compatible with the
court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.
Id.
35

See Nielsen, supra note 7, at 594.
See id. In discussing Case C-116.02, Erich Gasser GmbH v. Misat Srl, 2003 E.C.R. I-14693,
Professor Nielsen states, “Due to the inefficiency of the Italian court system, it would probably take
years for the Italian court to reach a decision on its jurisdiction.” Id.
37
See Brussels I, supra note 1. This provision of Brussels I (Article 29) made the torpedo action
possible. To deal with this problem, revisions in the Recast Regulation provide that in certain
circumstances if the parties have an exclusive choice-of-court agreement, courts of Member States other
than the Member State chosen by the parties must stay any proceedings until the court seised on the
basis of the parties’ agreement declares that it does not have jurisdiction. See Brussels Recast, supra
note 7, art. 31 (2)–(4). This should serve as a disincentive to potential torpedo actions in litigated
matters where parties have made an exclusive choice-of-court agreement.
38
See Case C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. I-3565.
39
See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶¶ 28–31.
40
See Case C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. I-3565, ¶¶ 28–31.
36
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Regulation.41 In that case, a vessel owned by West Tankers, which had
been chartered by an Italian company known as Erg Petroli (Erg), collided
with a jetty in Syracuse, Italy, causing damage. Erg collected some of its
damages from its insurers, Allianz and Generali. Then, pursuant to an
arbitration agreement between Erg and West Tankers, Erg began an
arbitration in London against West Tankers for damages in excess of its
insurance policy (Proceeding number 1). Erg’s insurers in Italy, seeking to
recover from West Tankers the amount they had paid Erg under the policy,
brought a claim against West Tankers in an Italian court (Proceeding
number 2). West Tankers then asked an English Court to enjoin the
insurers from taking further steps in the Italian proceeding, arguing that
because the insurers were subrogated to Erg’s claim, they were also bound
by the arbitration clause to arbitrate their claims in London (Proceeding
number 3). The High Court of England granted the anti-suit injunction
against the insurers, ordering them to stop the action in the Italian court,
noting that an injunction to protect arbitration, as opposed to litigation, was
permissible because arbitration was excluded from the Brussels I
Regulation.42
On appeal, the House of Lords shared the view that the injunction
should be granted but nonetheless referred to the ECJ the question of
whether an anti-suit injunction to restrain a party from breaching an
arbitration agreement by commencing litigation in another Member State
was compatible with the Brussels I Regulation.43 Meanwhile, the
arbitration in London continued, the insurers were added as co-claimants,
and in November 2008 the arbitral tribunal issued an award which held and
declared that West Tankers was not liable to the insurers.44
In its decision in West Tankers 2009, the ECJ gave three reasons for
holding that despite the arbitration exclusion, anti-suit injunctions were not
permitted by the Regulation.45 First, it said that when the subject matter of
the dispute was clearly within the scope of Brussels I—such as the tort
damages at issue in the instant case—then the validity of the arbitration
agreement was only a preliminary issue that was within the jurisdiction of
the Italian court.46 Second, it held that the court of one Member State did
41

See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶¶ 28–30, 32, 34.
West Tankers, Inc. v. SpA, [2005] EWHC (Comm) 454, [2005] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 240 (Eng.).
43
West Tankers Inc v. RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA, [2007] UKHL 4, [2007] 1 Lloyd’s
Rep. 391 ¶¶ 14–15. The actual question that the House of Lords referred to the ECJ was the following:
“Is it consistent with EC Regulation 44/2001 for a court of a Member State to make an order to restrain
a person from commencing or continuing proceedings in another Member State on the ground that such
proceedings are in breach of an arbitration agreement?” Id. ¶ 23.
44
See West Tankers Inc. v. Allianz SpA, [2011] EWHC (Comm) 829, [6] (Eng.) (describing the
tribunal award).
45
See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663.
46
See id. ¶ 26. In its earlier ruling in Marc Rich, the ECJ said that the subject matter (appointing an
42
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not have the right to strip another Member State court of the power to rule
on its own jurisdiction by ordering a party to abandon an action in that
court.47 Such a step would be against the mutual trust principle that was at
the core of the Regulation.48 Third, the consequences of the anti-suit
injunction would be fundamentally unjust because the enjoined party would
be “barred from access to the court . . . and would therefore be deprived of
a form of judicial protection to which it is entitled.”49 The court also
suggested that its decision was supported by the New York Convention,50
which provides that a court seised of an action in a case where parties have
made an arbitration agreement, “will, at the request of one of the parties,
refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.”51 The New York
Convention, however, does not deal with issues of timing or priority. The
lack of clarity in some aspects of West Tankers 2009 and the blurring of the
interface between arbitration and litigation were to become highly debated
topics in Europe.
B. Reaction to West Tankers
There was a large and generally negative reaction to West Tankers
2009 from the arbitration community, particularly the English arbitration
community. Increasingly, arbitration generates substantial income for
arbitral institutions as well as for businesses in arbitration-friendly regimes.
The ever-growing stakes encourage competition among various institutions
and venues to be more attractive to parties who want to arbitrate.52 The
English feared that parties would no longer favor London as an arbitration
seat if English courts could not enjoin parallel proceedings.53 In fact, it did
arbitrator) was arbitration, so the arbitration exclusion applied. Case C-190-89, Marc Rich & Co. AG v.
Società Italiana Impianti PA, 1991 E.C.R. 1-03855. In Van Uden, the ECJ found that provisional
measures as such do not concern arbitration, but a wider variety of rights. So, they are covered under
the Convention. Case C-391/95, Van Uden v. Deco-Line, 1998 E.C.R. I-07091. Here, the ECJ is saying
that the subject matter of the dispute is not arbitration but tort damages, so arbitration is merely a
preliminary issue and is therefore covered by the Regulation. Id.
47
See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶ 28.
48
See id. ¶ 30.
49
Id. ¶ 31.
50
See id. ¶ 33.
51
New York Convention, supra note 4, art. II, ¶ 3.
52
See Illmer, supra note 18, at 646 & n.1 (“Arbitration has become an industry sector generating
considerable turnover at the preferred arbitration seats around the world,” citing a study that estimated
“the total value of the fees generated by the main European arbitrations centers not including ad hoc
arbitrations at around EUR 4 billion per year.”).
53
See West Tankers Inc v. RAS Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA, [2007] UKHL 4, [2007] 1
Lloyd’s Rep. 391 ¶ 21 (“If the Member States of the European Community are unable to offer a seat of
arbitration capable of making orders restraining parties from acting in breach of the arbitration
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not take long for some commentators to opine that if parties were concerned
about the risk of vexatious parallel proceedings, they should select a
jurisdiction such as the United States as the seat of their arbitration.54
At the time of the West Tankers 2009 decision in February 2009,
however, proposals were already circulating about amending Brussels I
with respect to a number of areas.55 The Regulation itself required the
European Commission to present a report on the application of the
Regulation and possible proposals for adjustments or adaptations within
five years after its effective date in 2001.56 Somewhat late, the Commission
presented a report57 and a green paper in 2009,58 which took into
consideration a number of previously commissioned studies and reports,
including a 2007 study known as the Heidelberg Report.59 The Heidelberg
Report advocated as one proposal the abolition of the arbitration exclusion
and as another the inclusion of some specific rules in the Regulation to deal
with problems of jurisdiction and recognition of judgments related to
arbitration.60 This study influenced the Commission, which put forward in
its Report and Green Paper a number of proposals for discussion.61 There
were a great many comments from different groups and individuals in
response to the Green Paper, many of which addressed the question of the
interface of arbitration with Brussels I.62
agreement, there is no shortage of other states which will.”). The House of Lords expressed its concern
about potential elimination of anti-suit injunctions as a concern for loss of arbitrations in Europe
generally, but it was primarily referring to London. See id. Most Member States are civil law countries
whose courts would not grant anti-suit injunctions in any event. See Radicati di Brozolo, supra note 18,
at 430.
54
See, e.g., Rainier, supra note 14, at 436 (“Indeed, after the ECJ’s decision in West Tankers, the
United States could potentially become more attractive as a seat of arbitration of parties to transnational
agreements interested in ensuring that they do not end up litigating their disputes in multiple
jurisdictions.”).
55
See Nielsen, supra note 7, at 586 (describing surveys the EU Commission conducted in the
Member States between 2004 and 2009 about the application of Brussels I).
56
See Brussels I, supra note 1, art. 73.
57
See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council and the European
Economic and Social Committee on the Application of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
COM (2009) 174 final (Apr. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Report on No 44/2001].
58
See Commission Green Paper, supra note 32.
59
See Heidelberg Report, supra note 32.
60
See id. § 131 (“[T]he interfaces between the Judgment Regulation [(JR) that is, the Brussels I
Regulation] and arbitration should be addressed in a more sophisticated way than by the all embracing
exclusion of arbitration in Article 1(2)(d) JR. In the current discussion, two possible avenues should be
advocated. The first is to delete Article 1 (2)(d) JR . . . . The second . . . is to address the interfaces
between arbitration and the Judgment Regulation in a positive, comprehensive way . . . .”).
61
See Report on No 44/2001, supra note 57; Commission Green Paper, supra note 32.
62
See Illmer, supra note 18, at 657 & n.42 (referring to a list of over 100 contributors at
ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/news_consulting_0002_en.htm).
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Many in the arbitration community were quite alarmed by the Green
Paper proposals. The concerns were that the extensive regulation of
arbitration that was proposed would greatly limit the autonomy of Member
States with respect to arbitration and would jeopardize the body of
arbitration law of some of the States.63 Moreover, it was believed that the
proposed amendments would impinge upon courts’ obligations under the
New York Convention and repudiate the doctrine of competencecompetence.64
As a general matter, many in the arbitration community wanted to
keep the arbitration exclusion in the Brussels I Regulation.65 This was the
very strong proposal of an International Bar Association Working Group.66
In addition, the European Parliament passed a resolution opposing deletion
of the arbitration exclusion.67
Given the robust debate about the interface of arbitration and
Brussels I, the European Commission decided in June 2010 to appoint an
international Group of Experts—practitioners and academics—to provide a
recommendation.68 The recommendation and proposal of the Group of
Experts, submitted in October 2010, was adopted by the Commission and
put forth as the Commission Proposal in December 2010.69

63

See Radicati di Brozolo, supra note 18, at 433–34.
See id. at 433. Competence-competence is the doctrine that holds that arbitrators have the
authority to decide their own jurisdiction. See infra note 79.
65
See Kessedjian, The Proposed Arbitration Provisions in the Recast of Regulation 44/2001, supra
note 18, at 205 (“[T]hose who are arbitration specialists are mostly opposed to changing the arbitration
exception unless it is to reinforce it.”).
66
In its report, the Working Group of the International Bar Association Arbitration Committee concluded
as follows: “[T]here seems to be no compelling reason for deleting the arbitration exclusion; such a deletion
would actually adversely affect the effectiveness of arbitration agreements and the circulation of arbitral
awardsError! Hyperlink reference not valid..” Submission from the Working Grp. of the Int’l Bar
Ass’n
Arbitration
Comm.
to
the
Eur.
Comm’n
(June
15,
2009),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0002/contributions/civil_society_ngo_
academics_others/international_bar_association_arbitration_committee_en.pdf.
67
The Parliamentary Resolution dealt with many different aspects of the implementation of Brussels
I, but with respect to arbitration it provided that it “[s]trongly opposes the (even partial) abolition of the
exclusion of arbitration from the scope.” Resolution on Implementation and Review of Council
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, PARL. EUR. DOC. (COM 0304) 9 (2010).
68
See Illmer, supra note 18, at 657.
69
See id.
64
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C. The Commission Proposal of 201070
The Commission Proposal offered a compromise. The arbitration
exclusion in the Brussels I Regulation would remain but with a limited
exception. Article 29(4) of the proposed Recast Regulation provided as
follows:
Where the agreed or designated seat of an arbitration is in a
Member State, the courts of another Member State whose
jurisdiction is contested on the basis of an arbitration agreement
shall stay proceedings once the courts of the Member State where
the seat of the arbitration is located or the arbitral tribunal have
been seised of proceedings to determine, as their main object or
as an incidental question, the existence, validity or effects of that
arbitration agreement.
This paragraph does not prevent the court whose jurisdiction
is contested from declining jurisdiction in the situation referred to
above if its national law so prescribes.
Where the existence, validity or effects of the arbitration
agreement are established, the court seised shall decline
jurisdiction.
This paragraph does not apply in disputes concerning
matters referred to in Sections 3, 4, and 5 of Chapter II.71
Thus, the preferred court for jurisdictional purposes would be the court
of the Member State at the seat of arbitration or the arbitral tribunal once
either one was seised of proceedings. This would be true even if an action
had been commenced earlier in another Member State court.72 Once
arbitration or a court action was commenced in the seat, any other Member
State court whose jurisdiction was challenged based on the arbitration
agreement would have to stay proceedings.73 Moreover, once the existence,
70

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), COM (2010) 748
final (Dec. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Commission Proposal].
71
Id. The carve-out from the proposed regulation contained in this last sentence pertains to
insurance (Section 3), consumers (Section 4) and employment (Section 5).
72
See Illmer, supra note 18, at 661 (“[I]t is not the court seised first in time that is exclusively
competent to determine the arbitration agreement’s validity but, regardless of timing, the seat court or
alternatively the arbitral tribunal.”).
73
See Commission Proposal, supra note 70, art. 29(4).
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validity, or effect of the arbitration agreement was established in the seat,
the foreign court would have to decline jurisdiction. This kind of rule is
known as a lis pendens rule.74
The Commission Proposal was seen as a positive development by
many because it basically retained the arbitration exclusion, except for the
lis pendens rule. By deferring to the parties’ choice of the seat as the
jurisdiction that would decide whether the arbitration agreement was valid,
it offered a reasonable solution to the torpedo problem. There would now
be a substantial disincentive for a party to file suit in another country
because the non-seat court would have to stay the action and potentially
decline jurisdiction. The lis pendens rule would likely discourage parties
from filing parallel proceedings simply to delay and harass or to torpedo the
other party because the non-seat litigation would simply not go forward.
In addition to Article 29(4), the Proposal provided in Article 33(3) a
rule specifying when an arbitral tribunal would be deemed seised for
purposes of the lis pendens rule: “an arbitral tribunal is deemed to be seised
when a party has nominated an arbitrator or when a party has requested the
support of an institution, authority or court for the tribunal’s constitution.”75
This was a less appropriate change because it was not consistent with some
of the international rules, such as Article 21 of the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration, which provides as follows:
“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral proceedings in respect
of a particular dispute commence on the date on which a request for that
dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent.”76
The Commission Proposal generally found support, however, because
the lis pendens rule along with the definition of “seised” were the only
provisions pertaining to arbitration that would be part of the Recast
Brussels Regulation if the Proposal were adopted. National law would
govern any other arbitration matters. Moreover, the Proposal seemed to
offer a very reasonable solution even it was not a perfect one. It largely
kept arbitration out of the Regulation and yet resolved the problem of the
torpedo action. In his thorough and insightful article on the Proposal,
Professor Luca Radicati di Brozolo concluded, “The Proposal is overall a
satisfactory compromise to the quandary of the interface between
arbitration and the European jurisdictional space.”77

74

Lis Pendens Definition, FREE DICTIONARY BY FARLEX, http://legal-dictionary.thefree
dictionary.com/lis+pendens (last visited Oct. 12, 2014). “Lis pendens” is Latin for “suit pending.” Id.
75
See Commission Proposal, supra note 70, art. 33(3).
76
U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, art. 21, U.N. Sales No. E.95.V.18 (1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 1985],
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/06-54671_Ebook.pdf.
77
Radicati di Brozolo, supra note 18, at 460.
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The Proposal seemed generally acceptable to many in the arbitration
community. For example, the Arbitration Committee of the International
Bar Association (IBA) found the Proposal substantially in line with the
IBA’s recommendations that had been submitted earlier in response to the
Green Paper.78 It noted that the Proposal made clear that arbitration was
generally excluded from the Regulation and that Article 29(4) would not
prevent a court from declining jurisdiction when there was prima facie an
arbitration agreement and when a country admitted the negative effect of
competence-competence.79 The IBA Arbitration Committee concluded that
if adopted, the Proposal “would be a major development in favour of
arbitration.”80
There were others, however, including some in the arbitration
community, who did not want the camel to put his nose under the tent.
They feared that any reference to arbitration in the Recast Regulation, other
than the arbitration exclusion, might permit a court to rule on some further
issues that it found to be arbitration related just as the ECJ had done in West
Tankers.81 In particular, the Legislative Action Committee (LAC) of the
European Parliament maintained its very strong opposition to including any
mention of arbitration issues in Brussels I.82 In its Draft Report in June
2011, LAC maintained that there should be an absolute exclusion of
arbitration from the Recast Regulation on the grounds that arbitration is
“satisfactorily dealt with” by the New York Convention and the 1961

78
See Changes to Brussels Regulation – Dec 2010 Update, INT’L BAR ASS’N,
http://www.ibanet.org/LPD/Dispute_Resolution_Section/Arbitration/Projects.aspx [hereinafter Changes
to Brussels Regulation] (last visited Sept. 20, 2014).
79
See id. Competence-competence is a widely followed doctrine in international arbitration that
holds that an arbitral tribunal is competent to determine its own competence. That is, it has the power to
determine whether it has jurisdiction.
See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 1019 (2014). The negative effect of competence-competence is that in certain countries,
such as France, courts cannot in most instances make the decision about arbitrator competence, but must
defer to the arbitral tribunal, which will determine in the first instance whether it has jurisdiction. Id.
The French Code of Civil Procedure, Article 1448 provides that “when a dispute subject to an
arbitration agreement is brought before a court, such court shall decline jurisdiction except if an arbitral
tribunal has not yet been seised of the dispute and if the arbitration agreement is manifestly void or
manifestly inapplicable.” Id. at 1111 n.356. The meaning of manifestly void or manifestly inapplicable
has been narrowly interpreted by the French courts. SANDRA SYNKOVÀ, COURTS’ INQUIRY INTO
ARBITRAL JURISDICTION AT THE PRE-AWARD STAGE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ENGLISH,
GERMAN AND SWISS LEGAL ORDER 89–90 (2013). Gary Born notes that case law on the subject has
been codified by Article 1455 of the revised French Code. BORN, supra note 79, at 1113. Article 1455
provides, “If an arbitration agreement is manifestly void or manifestly not applicable, the judge acting in
support of the arbitration shall declare that no appointment [of an arbitrator] need be made.” Id. at 1112
n.360.
80
See Changes to Brussels Regulation, supra note 78.
81
See Radicati di Brozolo, supra note 18, at 457–58.
82
See Draft Report, supra note 31.
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Geneva Convention on International Commercial Arbitration.83 In the same
month, the Council of Justice and Home Affairs (the Council) also
approved a deletion of Article 29(4) and provided a more extensive
amendment to the explanatory recital, which became Recital 12 in the
Recast Regulation.84 Thus, neither the proposed Article 33(3) nor the
proposed lis pendens rule in Article 29(4) was ultimately included in the
Recast Brussels Regulation.85
After extensive negotiations among EU institutions, governments, and
various stakeholders, the Recast Brussels Regulation was approved in
December 2012.86 The end result was far different from the original
proposals by the European Commission in its Green Paper and from the
carefully constructed compromise in the Commission Proposal of
December 2010, which was rejected by the Parliament and the Council.
III. BRUSSELS I RECAST
In the text of the Recast Regulation, the arbitration exclusion remains
the same as in Brussels I. The only changes are (1) the extensive Recital
12, which attempts to explain how the arbitration exclusion should be
understood in relation to the Brussels I Regulation, and (2) a new Article
73(2), which specifically provides that the Brussels I Regulation shall not
affect the application of the 1958 New York Convention. The four
paragraphs of Recital 12, which will be discussed below, make clear that
parallel proceedings in arbitration and litigation will continue, that a court’s
decision on the validity of an arbitration agreement cannot come within the
Recast Regulation even if it is a preliminary question, that the New York
Convention has primacy over the Recast with respect to questions of
enforcement, and that no ancillary proceedings relating to arbitration are
within the Recast’s scope.87 The exclusion of arbitration from the Recast
83
Id. at 48. The Committee simply deleted Article 29(4) and somewhat expanded the explanation in
Recital 11 (which was redrafted by the Council to become Recital 12 in the Recast Regulation). Id. The
Report was incorrect, however, as to all Members of the European Union being parties to the Geneva
Convention. A number are not. For example, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Portugal, and the
Netherlands, among other countries, are not parties to the Geneva Convention. See Chapter XXII
Commercial Arbitration: European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no
=XXII-2&chapter=22& lang=en (last updated Oct. 12, 2014) (providing a list of the thirty-one adherents).
84
See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast) - First
Reading - General Approach, 10609/12 JUSTCIV209 CODEC 1495 ADD 1 (showing the deletion of
Article 29(4) of the Commission’s Proposal, and in footnote 1 to Article 84, the Recital that was to
become Recital 12 in the Recast Regulation).
85
See Brussels Recast, supra note 7.
86
See id.
87
Although a recital is not an operative provision of the legislation, in European law if an operative
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Regulation’s regime remains intact, but there is much to be learned from
the explanatory Recital.
A. Recital 12, Paragraph 1: Permitting Parallel Proceedings
Even though arbitration is excluded from the scope of the Recast, the
drafters of Recital 12 wanted to help courts and parties understand how this
exclusion would actually work. The first paragraph of Recital 12 clarifies
that a court’s decision regarding an arbitration agreement will not be
governed by the jurisdictional rules under the Recast Regulation. The
paragraph provides that when any court is seised of a matter regarding
which the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement, nothing in the
Recast Regulation will prevent that court from the following: (1) referring
the parties to arbitration, (2) staying or dismissing the proceedings, or
(3) examining whether the arbitration agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed in accordance with national
law.88
Thus, when a court is first seised by a matter where an arbitration
agreement has been alleged, this does not require a second court to await its
decision on jurisdiction. Proceedings in the two courts can go forward
simultaneously. Therefore, parallel proceedings cannot prevent one court
from acting because the other court was first seised.
Of course, in West Tankers 2009 the arbitration tribunal was always
free to continue its proceedings because arbitration is excluded from the
Brussels I Regulation. But even though the ECJ in West Tankers focused
on whether an anti-suit injunction to protect arbitration was permissible, its
decision appeared to be more far-reaching. It indicated that once the Italian
court decided the validity of the arbitration agreement then, because the
jurisdictional question was a preliminary issue related to the substance of
the dispute, both came within the scope of the Regulation.89 The logical
consequence appeared to be that the English court would be bound by the
Italian court’s decision on the validity of the arbitration agreement. That is
how the Court of Appeal in London interpreted West Tankers 2009 in a
subsequent case, National Navigation Co. v. Endesa Generacion SA
(Endesa). Relying on its understanding of West Tankers 2009, the Court of
Appeal in London held that a Spanish court’s finding that an arbitration
agreement was invalid would bind the English court under the Regulation.90
provision is ambiguous, it is interpreted in light of the recital. See, e.g., Tadas Klimas & Jurate
Vaiciukaite, The Law of Recitals in European Community Legislation, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 61,
73 (2008).
88
Brussels Recast, supra note 7, Recital 12, ¶ 1.
89
Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶¶ 22, 26, 27.
90
Navigation Co. v. Endesa Generacion SA, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1397 (Eng.). However, not all
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B. Recital 12, Paragraph 2: Reversing Endesa
Whether or not Endesa was correctly decided by the English court,
paragraph 2 of Recital 12 makes clear that under the Recast such an
interpretation would be incorrect. In Endesa, there was a dispute over late
delivery for goods that were not delivered to the proper contractual point of
discharge as required by the bill of lading.91 Endesa, a Spanish energy
company, initiated an action for damages in a Spanish court. National
Navigation Co., an Egyptian shipping company, initiated in the English
court a court action claiming a declaration of nonliability; however, in the
Spanish court, National Navigation sought a declaration that an arbitration
clause had been incorporated into the bill of lading.92 It subsequently
commenced an arbitration proceeding in London. The Spanish court found
under Spanish law that the bill of lading did not incorporate the arbitration
clause.93 Thus, the question arose before the English Court of Appeal
whether the Spanish court’s ruling that there was no valid arbitration clause
was a judgment within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation (which must
be recognized by the English court).94
The English court held that although the proceedings in the Spanish
court concerned arbitration, the Spanish judgment was a Regulation
judgment and was binding on the English court.95 This effectively
terminated the arbitration. Even if the Spanish judgment was arguably not
directly binding on the arbitral tribunal in London,96 any arbitral award
commentators agree that the English Court of Appeal correctly interpreted West Tankers on this point.
See, e.g., Vesna Lazić, The Commission’s Proposal to Amend the Arbitration Exception in the EC
Jurisdiction Regulation: How ‘Much Ado about Nothing’ Can End Up in a ‘Comedy of Errors’ and in
Anti-suit Injunctions Brussels-style, 29 J. of INT’L ARB. 20, 24 (2012) (asserting that the English court
reached “an obviously incorrect conclusion” because “a decision on the validity of an arbitration itself
falls outside the scope of the Regulation”(internal citations omitted)).
91
Navigation Co. v. Endesa Generacion SA, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1397, ¶ 1 (Eng.).
92
Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
93
Id. ¶ 8(xiii).
94
Id. ¶ 5.
95
See id. ¶¶ 59, 69, 119, 123.
96
Some courts consider that a foreign judgment would bind an arbitral tribunal. For example, in the
Endesa decision, Lord Justice Moore-Bick stated in dicta as follows:
It is quite true that the Regulation itself does not apply to arbitral tribunals and that
arbitrators are not therefore bound by the Regulations themselves to recognize judgments
of the courts of Member States of the EU, but it does not follow that foreign judgments,
whether of the courts of Member States or other countries, can be disregarded in
arbitration proceedings. A judgment of a foreign court which is regarded under English
conflicts of laws rules as having jurisdiction and which is final and conclusive on the
merits is entitled to recognition at common law . . . . It follows, therefore, that arbitrators
applying English law are bound to give effect to that rule. There is nothing new in this; it
has long been recognized that a judgment of a foreign court can give rise to estoppel by
res judicata . . . – and the principle is routinely applied in arbitration proceedings.
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against the Spanish defendant would no doubt be vacated by an English
court because the Spanish decision holding there was no right to arbitrate
had been held to be binding. Certainly, any attempt by a claimant to
enforce in Spain an award granted in these circumstances would be futile.
The Endesa holding, however, appears to be reversed by the language
in Recital 12, which provides as follows:
A ruling given by a court of a Member State as to whether or not
an arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable
of being performed should not be subject to the rules of
recognition and enforcement laid down in this Regulation,
regardless of whether the court decided on this as a principal
issue or as an incidental question.97
Thus, the Recast Regulation makes clear that a court’s decision on the
validity of an arbitration agreement is not subject to the Recast Regulation’s
recognition and enforcement rules even when it is an incidental question
related to the substance of a dispute within the scope of the Recast. This
means that in a situation like Endesa the English court would not be bound
by the Spanish court’s decision and could make its own independent
decision as to whether there was a valid arbitration agreement. This results
in autonomy for national courts with respect to determining the validity of
arbitration agreements but also in a higher risk of inconsistent decisions.
The resulting inconsistent decision will, of course, raise the question of
what law governs the enforcement of those decisions. What is the relation
between rules of enforcement under the Recast and under the New York
Convention?
C. Recital 12, Paragraph 3: Giving Primacy to the New York
Convention
Paragraph 3 of Recital 12 tries to help answer this enforcement
question. Assuming that inconsistent decisions will result when, for
example, an arbitral tribunal in one jurisdiction issues an arbitration award
finding the respondent liable while a court in another jurisdiction issues a
judgment finding no liability, what happens next? The Recast Regulation
provides that once a court has determined that the arbitration agreement is
not valid, it can render a judgment on the substance of the dispute (i.e., the
merits) that should be recognized and enforced in accordance with the

Id. ¶ 118.
97
Brussels Recast, supra note 7, Recital 12, ¶ 2.
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Regulation.98 However, assuming an inconsistent arbitration award dealing
with the same matter has also been issued in another jurisdiction, that award
may be enforceable under the New York Convention. While Article 73(2)
of the Recast Regulation provides that the Regulation “shall not affect the
application of the 1958 New York Convention,” it does not specifically
give the New York Convention primacy over the Recast.99 However,
Recital 12 clearly states that the New York Convention takes precedence
over the Recast.100
Nonetheless, for a court looking for reasons not to enforce, there is a
possible though not very persuasive argument that although Recital 12 says
that the New York Convention takes precedence over the Recast
Regulation, the statement has no operative effect because it is not contained
in the operative provisions.101 Scholars assert, however, that a clear recital
in European legislation controls an ambiguous operative provision, such
that the operative provision will be interpreted in light of the recital.102
Thus, because Article 73(2) of the Recast Regulation is not clear on its face
about whether the New York Convention or the Regulation has priority, the
provision should be interpreted in light of Recital 12, which gives the New
York Convention precedence.
However, if the claimant tries to enforce its award at the enforcing
court, where the assets of the respondent can be found, that court is likely to
be in the home country of the respondent and is also likely to be the same
court where the respondent brought suit. Thus, that same court would have
already found that there was no arbitration agreement and that the
defendant or respondent had no liability. As a result, there may be some
question whether such a court would go against its own decision and
enforce the inconsistent arbitral award under the New York Convention.
The court might try to find reasons not to enforce, such as public policy.
However, the public policy basis for non-enforcement of an arbitration

98
Id. ¶ 3 (“[W]here a court of a Member State, exercising jurisdiction under this Regulation or
under national law, has determined that an arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed, this should not preclude that court’s judgment on the substance of the
matter from being recognized or, as the case may be, enforced in accordance with this Regulation.”).
99
See id. art. 73(2). Not all Member State courts believe the Convention has primacy over the
Convention. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 151–55 (describing the Supreme Court of
Lithuania’s position that the Brussels I Regulation should take precedence over the New York
Convention).
100
Id. Recital 12, ¶ 3 (“[The obligation to enforce a judgment] should be without prejudice to the
competence of the courts of the Member States to decide on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards in accordance with the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards . . . which takes pre-cedence over this Regulation”).
101
Cf. Klimas & Vaiciukaite, supra note 87, at 92 (concluding that “[w]here the recital is clear, it
will control an ambiguous operative provision”).
102
Id. at 92.
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award under the New York Convention has been interpreted narrowly.103
Although one can only speculate about likely results when courts are
faced with conflicting decisions, it is evident that when the European Union
rejected the European Commission proposal for giving jurisdictional
preference to the seat of arbitration, it created a range of potential factors
and outcomes that can serve to complicate arbitration proceedings and
enforcement. Nonetheless, the Recast Regulation is helpful in identifying
what is not within its scope as will be discussed below with respect to
ancillary proceedings.
D. Recital 12, Paragraph 4: No Ancillary Proceedings Within the
Scope of the Brussels Recast
1. The Content of Ancillary Proceedings
In addition to various points discussed above based on paragraphs 1
through 3 of Recital 12, in paragraph 4 the Recital makes clear that
ancillary proceedings—that is, court proceedings connected with
arbitration—are not subject to the Recast Regulation’s regime.
The Regulation should not apply to any actions or ancillary
proceedings relating to, in particular, the establishment of an arbitral
tribunal; the powers of arbitrators; the conduct of an arbitration procedure
or any other aspects of such a procedure; or to any action or judgment
concerning the annulment, review, appeal, recognition, or enforcement of
an arbitral award.104
Thus, some of the typical interactions of a court with an arbitration
proceeding, such as establishing a tribunal105 or reviewing a tribunal’s claim
of jurisdiction,106 are not subject to the Recast Regulation. Moreover, when
103
See, e.g., Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft M.B.H. (D.S.T.) v. Ras Al Khaimah
Nat’l Oil Co. (Rakoil), [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 246, 257 (C.A.) (Eng.) (stating that in order to set aside an
award on public policy grounds a party must prove “some element of illegality or that the enforcement
of the award would be clearly injurious to the public good . . .”); see also Thales Air Defence v.
Euromissile et al., Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., Nov. 18, 2004, REV. ARB.,
2005, 751 (Fr.) (stating that a violation of public policy must be “flagrant, effective and concrete” in
order to be sanctioned). But cf. infra text accompanying notes 142–43 (discussing how Lithuania’s
Court of Appeal refused to enforce an award that amounted to an anti-suit injunction).
104
Brussels Recast, supra note 7, Recital 12, ¶ 4.
105
See Case C-190-89, Marc Rich & Co. AG v. Società Italiana Impianti PA, 1991 E.C.R. I-03855.
106
See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 1985, supra note 76, art. 16(3) (providing that an arbitral
tribunal’s decision that it has jurisdiction may be reviewed by a court within thirty days). The Model
Law has been adopted in over sixty-five countries, as well as in a number of territories, provinces, and
states in the United States. See Status UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
(1985), with amendments as adopted in 2006, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html [hereinafter Status UNCITRAL Model
Law] (last visited Oct. 12, 2014).
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a court vacates an arbitral award or when it recognizes and enforces an
award, no other Member State is required by the Recast to recognize and
enforce that court’s judgment. Nonetheless, because all Member States are
subject to the New York Convention, this should lead toward some
convergence of recognition and enforcement standards.107 It is less likely,
however, that there will be convergence of acceptance of anti-suit
injunctions as ancillary proceedings.
2. Anti-suit Injunctions as Ancillary Proceedings
The broad language above stating that “[t]he Regulation should not
apply to any actions or ancillary proceedings” may give some hope to those
who would like to see the anti-suit injunction reinstated to protect
arbitration. After all, the ECJ’s main logical argument against anti-suit
injunctions in the West Tankers 2009 decision is somewhat undercut by
Recital 12. The ECJ anchored its decision in West Tankers 2009 on the
theory that since the subject matter of the dispute fell within the scope of
the Regulation, a preliminary issue such as the validity of the arbitration
agreement was also within the Regulation’s scope.108 Thus, according to
the court, the use of an anti-suit injunction to resolve a jurisdictional dispute
would strip the foreign court of the power the Regulation gave it under

107

In any event, international practice is not consistent on enforcement of awards. The courts of
some jurisdictions will in certain circumstances enforce an award that has been set aside (i.e., vacated)
in another jurisdiction. In addition, internationally, an award may be enforced in one jurisdiction and
refused enforcement in another. See, e.g., Société Hilmarton Ltd. v. Société OTV, Cour de cassation
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], Mar. 23, 1994, YB Comm. Arb. 1995, XX, 663 (Fr.); La
Direction Générale de L’Aviation Civile de l’Émirat de Dubaï v. Société International Bechtel Co., Cour
d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., Sept. 29, 2005 (Fr.); see also Corporación
Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. de C.V. v. Pemex-Exploración Y Producción, No. 10
Civ. 206 (AKH), 2013 WL 4517225, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2013) (confirming an award under the
Panama Convention nullified in Mexico because the nullification violated the United States’ basic
notions of justice); Mike McClure, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards That Have Been Set Aside at the
Seat: The Consistently Inconsistent Approach Across Europe, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (June 26, 2012),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/06/26/enforcement-of-arbitral-awards-that-have-been-setaside-at-the-seat-the-consistently-inconsistent-approach-across-europe/ (stating that Paris and the
Netherlands have recognized such awards while England and Germany tend to take the view that once
an award is annulled at the seat, the court cannot recognize or enforce it). In addition, internationally, an
award may be enforced in one jurisdiction and refused enforcement in another. See Dallah Real Estate
& Tourism Holding Co. v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Gov’t of Pak., [2010] UKSC 46, [2011] Bus.
L.R. 158 (stating that an award made in France was refused enforcement in the United Kingdom but
subsequently enforced in France); see also George A. Bermann, The U.K Supreme Court Speaks to
International Arbitration: Learning from the Dallah Case, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 4 (2011); Maxi
Scherer, Effects of Foreign Judgments Relating to International Arbitral Awards: Is the ‘Judgment
Route’ the Wrong Road, 4 J. INT’L DISP. RESOL. 587 (2013).
108
Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶ 26.
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Article 5(3)109 of the Regulation to rule on its own jurisdiction.110
However, Brussels Recast makes clear that any ruling on jurisdiction
arising out of a challenge based on the existence of an arbitration agreement
“regardless of whether the court decided on this as a principal issue or as an
incidental question”111 is not subject to rules laid down in the Recast.112
Thus, if the ruling on jurisdiction is not within the scope of the Recast
Regulation, it is arguable that an anti-suit injunction pertaining to the ruling
on jurisdiction is also not subject to the Recast. Such a step would appear
to be an “ancillary proceeding” related to an arbitration procedure, to which
the Recast Regulation should not apply.113
Nonetheless, because most civil law courts and practitioners object to
the use of anti-suit injunctions,114 if the issue goes back to the ECJ the
possibility that anti-suit injunctions would be reinstated as a mechanism to
protect arbitration is probably small. The Advocate General, Kokott, whose
opinion was largely followed by the ECJ in West Tankers 2009, noted the
following:
[A] unilateral anti-suit injunction is not, however, a suitable
measure to rectify [jurisdiction in two courts]. In particular, if
other member states were to follow the English example and also
introduce anti-suit injunctions, reciprocal injunctions would
ensue. Ultimately the jurisdiction which could impose higher
penalties for failure to comply with the injunction would
prevail.115
Similarly, Professor Radicati di Brozolo stated, “[G]iven that the same
game can be played by different players, the liberty to resort to anti-suit
injunctions is a recipe for chaos . . . .”116
109
Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation provides as follows: “A person domiciled in a Member
State may, in another Member State, be sued . . . in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the
courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur.” Brussels I, supra note 1, art. 5(3).
110
See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-00663, ¶¶ 27–28.
111
Brussels Recast, supra note 7, Recital 12, ¶ 2.
112
Id.
113
See id.
114
See, e.g., Radicati di Brozolo, supra note 18, at 430 (“[S]ince anti-suit injunctions are used
almost only by courts in the United Kingdom and Ireland, allowing them would be tantamount to
condoning what is viewed elsewhere as an imperialistic and condescending policy . . . .”). Professor
Radicati di Brozolo acknowledged, however, that “the courts in the United Kingdom are cautious about
granting anti-suit injunctions or interdicts and seek to be respectful of comity.” Id. at 430 n.30.
115
Case C-185/07, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Allianz SpA and Others v. West Tankers
Inc. ¶ 72, CURIA (Sept. 4, 2008), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang
=EN&text= &pageIndex=0&docid=66648&cid=286938.
116
Radicati di Brolozo, supra note 18, at 432.
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3. Issuance of Anti-suit Injunctions by Arbitrators
However, even if anti-suit injunctions by courts are found to be
impermissible, it may be that arbitrators can issue a form of anti-suit
injunction. Under the Recast Regulation, inconsistent judgments will occur
with no ready remedy given the lack of the kind of lis pendens rule that the
Commission Proposal had provided and without the possibility of a courtissued anti-suit injunction. In light of this, arbitral tribunals may fashion
their own remedies. Even if the Brussels Recast were interpreted to prevent
courts from issuing anti-suit injunctions, it does not appear that arbitral
tribunals are covered by this prohibition. Some arbitral laws and rules as
well as arbitral practice support the power of arbitrators “to take any
appropriate measures either to avoid the aggravation of the dispute or to
ensure the effectiveness of their future award.”117 Article 26 of the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, for example, provides that a tribunal may
grant an order to prevent harm to the arbitral process:
1. The arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, grant
interim measures.
2. An interim measure is any temporary measure by which, at any
time prior to the issuance of the award by which the dispute is
finally decided, the arbitral tribunal orders a party, for example,
and without limitation, to . . .
(b) Take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking
action that is likely to cause, (i) current or imminent harm or
(ii) prejudice to the arbitral process itself . . . .118

117
Emmanuel Gaillard, Anti-suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitrators, in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 2006: BACK TO BASICS? 235, 236–37 (Albert Jan van den Berg, ed., 2006). Mr. Gaillard,
a lawyer trained in the civil law tradition, points out that arbitrators’ jurisdiction to issue anti-suit
injunctions is confirmed by international arbitration practice, citing numerous cases in commercial
arbitration, investment arbitration, and the Iran Claims Tribunal where tribunals have issued anti-suit
injunctions. Id. at 244–59. He also notes that “[a]rbitral case law shows that arbitral tribunals have
repeatedly recognized their power to award damages for the breach by a party of its undertaking to
arbitrate its dispute . . . .” Id. at 238.
118
U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES [hereinafter UNCITRAL
ARBITRATION RULES], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rulesrevised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf. Moreover, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration as amended in 2006 contains identical language in Article 17(2). See U.N. COMM’N
ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
[hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 2006], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf. Additionally, under the ICC Rules of Arbitration
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Thus, under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules a tribunal could
conclude that a party who was starting litigation in another jurisdiction in
violation of an arbitration agreement was causing harm or prejudice to the
arbitral process and order the party to withdraw from that litigation. Such
an order could have the same effect as an anti-suit injunction.
The Iran–United States Claims Tribunal, which adopted the
UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration with some adjustments, used this
provision to good effect.119 One tribunal, which had ordered Iran to request
a stay in Iranian court litigation because of the arbitration before the
tribunal, noted, “This Tribunal has an inherent power to issue such orders as
may be necessary to conserve the respective rights of the Parties and to
ensure that this Tribunal’s jurisdiction and authority are made fully
effective.”120 There were in fact a number of cases in which a tribunal
ordered a party to stay duplicative proceedings in an Iranian court.121
It could be argued that a tribunal-issued order would not be as
effective as an anti-suit injunction because the tribunal does not have the
coercive powers available to a court, which can impose penalties such as
contempt of court or fines.122 However, there may be lessons to be learned
from a 2012 iteration of West Tankers (West Tankers 2012) where the
English High Court held that an arbitral tribunal should have awarded
damages to West Tankers.123 West Tankers had asked the arbitral tribunal
to award it damages against the respondent-insurers for their breach of the
arbitration agreement, as well as an indemnity to cover any potential
liability that might be found by the Italian court.124 The arbitral tribunal, in
a 2-1 decision, had reluctantly asserted it could not do so based on its belief
that such an award was prohibited by the ECJ’s interpretation of Brussels I
in West Tankers 2009.125 According to the arbitrators, the ECJ had
concluded in West Tankers 2009 that a party had a fundamental right to
28(1), the arbitral tribunal may order “any interim or conservatory measure it deems appropriate.” This
provides the tribunal with “the broadest possible power, including the power to order anti-suit injunctions.”
Christian Aschauer, Use of the ICC Emergency Arbitrator to Protect the Arbitral Proceedings, 23 ICC INT’L
CT. OF ARB. BULL. 5, 7 (2012).
119
See DAVID D. CARON & LEE M. CAPLAN, THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES 518 n.24 (2d
ed. 2013).
120
Laurent Lévy, Anti-suit Injunctions Issued by Arbitrators, in ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 115, 119 (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 2005) (citing from the Feb 4, 1983
Interim Award in Case No. 338, E-Systems, Inc. v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 51, 57 (1983)).
121
See id.
122
Court-imposed penalties for failing to comply with an anti-suit injunction can be significant.
See, e.g., Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial Ltda. v. GE Medical Systems Info. Techs., Inc., 369 F.
3d 645, 649 (2d Cir. 2004) (ordering a noncomplying party to pay U.S. $1000 per day for the first three
months and $5000 per day subsequently until it complied).
123
West Tankers Inc v. Allianz SpA & Anor, [2012] EWHC (Comm) 854.
124
See id. ¶ 25.
125
See id. ¶¶ 23–25 (discussion by the High Court).
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bring proceedings under Article 5(3) of the Regulation, and to deny that
right would be to undermine the principle of effective judicial protection.126
Therefore, the tribunal found it did not have the right to impose damages on
a party that was simply seeking to assert its fundamental right.127
The English High Court disagreed.128 Mr. Justice Flaux noted
specifically that the Advocate General (AG), with whom the ECJ had not
disagreed in West Tankers 2009, acknowledged that because arbitration was
outside the scope of Brussels I, courts and tribunals would be able to issue
inconsistent decisions.129 Because the AG had expressly recognized that a
tribunal could issue a different decision from that of a court, Mr. Justice
Flaux found there was no basis to conclude that the tribunal’s jurisdiction
was circumscribed by the Regulation as to the kinds of decisions it could
make.130 An award granting damages for breach of an arbitration clause, as
well as an indemnity, was simply a logical extension of the tribunal’s basic
award.131
Thus, Mr. Justice Flaux concluded that the arbitrators could grant the
remedy sought by West Tankers. He stated:
[G]iven that [the A.G.] recognises that one effect of her Opinion
would be that an arbitral tribunal could reach a different decision
from that of the court “first seised,” both as to the scope and
effectiveness of the agreement to arbitrate and as to the overall
merits, it seems to me impossible for the Respondents to contend
that her “philosophy” was that the arbitral tribunal would be
circumscribed in the jurisdiction it could exercise by the
provisions of the Regulation.132

126
The principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of EC law stemming from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States. See Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable
of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 5 E.C.R. 1651, ¶¶ 18–19 (1986). Member States must establish a
system of legal remedies to ensure that individual rights under EC law can be enforced. See Case C50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. I-06677, ¶ 41.
127
See West Tankers Inc v. Allianz SpA & Anor, [2012] EWHC (Comm) 854, ¶ 25 (citing ¶¶74–78
of the tribunal’s award).
128
See id. ¶ 25 (citing ¶ 78 of tribunal’s award). West Tankers had appealed to the court on a point
of law under the English Arbitration Law, section 69. See id. ¶ 1.
129
See id. ¶ 54.
130
See id. ¶¶ 54, 72.
131
See id.; see also id. ¶ 55 (“[T]here is no qualitative difference between a decision by an arbitral
tribunal on the merits, which is inconsistent with the approach that the Italian court might adopt in due
course as to the merits, and a decision by the arbitral tribunal to grant a declaration that the Respondents
[the insurers] should indemnify the Appellant [West Tankers] in respect of any liability the Italian court,
having considered the merits, might in due course conclude the Appellant was under.”).
132
Id. ¶ 54.
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Moreover, Mr. Justice Flaux’s view was that the principles elucidated
by the ECJ—the fundamental right of effective judicial protection and
mutual trust which apply to the legal systems of the Member States—do not
apply to private arbitral tribunals.133 He noted that the principle of effective
judicial protection is not freestanding, but can only be invoked to protect a
specific right, such as that provided under Article 5(3) of the Regulation.134
However, that right “is only engaged before courts of the member states,
not before arbitral tribunals. If the tribunal does not have to give effect to
the right under Article 5(3), then there is no reason why the tribunal does
not have jurisdiction to grant equitable damages or an indemnity.”135
Importantly for Mr. Justice Flaux, the ECJ decision was concerned
with an anti-suit injunction granted by a national court, not by an arbitral
tribunal.
The . . . conclusion [of the ECJ] makes the point . . . that the grant
by the English court of the anti-suit injunction is contrary to the
mutual trust which member states accord to one another’s legal
systems. The Respondents [insurers] can point to no wider
principle of European law which requires a private arbitral
tribunal in one member state to repose mutual trust in any system
of law other than that of the national court which supervises and
protects the arbitral process in the jurisdiction where the
arbitration takes place.136
Thus, the High Court’s West Tankers 2012 decision gives support not only
to an award of damages by an arbitral tribunal for breach of an arbitration
agreement, but its reasoning also gives analogous support for a tribunal’s
right to issue a form of anti-suit injunction when permitted by the laws or
rules under which the tribunal operates.
The High Court’s decision came down in April 2012 before the
Brussels Recast was adopted. However, nothing in the Recast Regulation
would appear to undermine this decision. Rather, the specifically described
exclusions of arbitration set forth in Recital 12 would seem to support the
reasoning that an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction is not circumscribed by the
Recast and that private tribunals are not subject to the principles imposed
on Member State legal systems—such as effective judicial protection and
mutual trust. Nonetheless, an anti-suit injunction may well be seen as an
interim measure, which may or may not be enforceable by national courts
133

See id. ¶¶ 59, 62.
See id. ¶ 63. Article 5(3) provides the right to sue for tort damages in the jurisdiction where the
tort occurred. Brussels I, supra note 1, art. 5(3).
135
West Tankers Inc v. Allianz SpA & Anor, [2012] EWHC (Comm) 854, ¶ 64.
136
Id. ¶ 59.
134
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and may not constitute an award that is enforceable under the New York
Convention.137
4. Enforcement of an Arbitral Anti-suit Injunction
A case recently referred to the ECJ,138 and not yet decided, should
shed light on whether an award issued by an arbitral tribunal that amounted
to an anti-suit injunction is subject to enforcement in a Member State court
under the New York Convention.139 In December 2013, the Lithuanian
Supreme Court referred to the ECJ three questions concerning whether a
Member State Court can refuse to enforce an arbitral award that amounted
to an anti-suit injunction.140 The dispute grew out of a Shareholders’
Agreement concerning the ownership and operation of Lietuvos Dujos,
Lithuania’s main gas provider.141 Shares were held by OAO Gazprom, the
Russian energy giant; Ruhrgas Energie Beteiligungs AG, a German energy
company; and the State Property Fund, acting on behalf of the Republic of
Lithuania.142 An arbitration clause in the Shareholders Agreement provided
for arbitration in Stockholm under the Rules of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce (SCC) of “any disputes or disagreements related to this
agreement or its breach, validity, entry into force or termination.”143 When
a dispute arose, however, the Republic of Lithuania, by its Ministry of
Energy, filed a claim against Lietuvos Dujos, its directors, and board (the

137
See, e.g., Peter J.W. Sherwin & Douglas C. Rennie, Interim Relief Under International
Arbitration Rules and Guidelines: A Comparative Analysis, 20 AMER. REV. INT’L ARB. 317, 331–33
(2009); see also James M. Gaitis, The Federal Arbitration Act: Risks & Incongruities Relating to the
Issuance of Interim and Partial Awards in Domestic & International Arbitrations, 16 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 1, 67–68 (2005); Tijana Kojovic, Court Enforcement of Arbitral Decisions on Provisional Relief,
How Final is Provisional?, 18 J. OF INT’L ARB. 511, 520–28 (2001). Interim measures are enforceable
in countries that have adopted the 2006 amendments to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 2006, supra note 118, art. 17 H (“An interim
measure issued by an arbitral tribunal shall be recognized as binding and, unless otherwise provided by
the arbitral tribunal, enforced upon application to the competent court, irrespective of the country in
which it was issued . . . .”). However, only a few Model Law states have adopted the 2006 amendments.
See Status UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 106.
138
See Request for a Preliminary Ruling from the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas (Lithuania)
Lodged on 14 October 2013 — Gazprom OAO, Other Party to the Proceedings: Republic of Lithuania
(Case C-536/13), 2013 O.J. (C 377) 7.
139
See Case Summaries, Lithuania No. 2, OAO Gazprom v. The Republic of Lithuania, represented
by the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Lithuania, Court of Appeal of Lithuania, 17 December 2012
and Supreme Court of Lithuania, Civil Case No. 3K-7-326/2013, 10 October 2013, YB Comm. Arb.
2013, XXXVII, 417–23 (Lith.).
140
Id. ¶¶ 81, 89.
141
Id. ¶ 4.
142
Id. ¶ 5.
143
Id. ¶ 4.
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defendants) in its national court in Vilnius, Lithuania.144 The Republic of
Lithuania asked for an investigation to be conducted and, if activities of the
defendants were found to be improper, for managers to be removed and
other steps to be taken.145 A few months later, Gazprom began an SCC
arbitration claiming that the court action was in violation of the arbitration
agreement.146
The SCC tribunal issued an award that found that the Republic of
Lithuania had partially breached the arbitration clause in the Shareholders
Agreement and that it should withdraw certain requests from the court
proceeding and limit other requests, essentially requiring the Republic of
Lithuania to remove from the litigation the claims that could be
arbitrated.147 Gazprom then sought recognition and enforcement of the
award in the Court of Appeal for Lithuania.148
In December 2012, the Lithuanian Court of Appeal refused to
recognize the arbitration award issued by the SCC arbitral tribunal, in part
because the award contained an anti-suit injunction.149 The Court of
Appeal stated that if it enforced the award, the tribunal’s requirements that
Lithuania withdraw or limit its claims in court
would become mandatory in the territory of the Republic of
Lithuania and would directly influence the legal capacity of legal
entities participating in the proceedings and limit the jurisdiction
of national courts. This would not only breach several
constitutional principles related to the right of an individual to the
hearing of his case in an objective, impartial and fair court . . . but
also affect the sovereignty of the state . . . which would
undoubtedly be contrary to the public policy of the Republic of
Lithuania as well as to international public policy.150
Thus, according to the Court of Appeal, the award was not enforceable
under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention, which permits a court
to refuse to recognize and enforce an award that is against the public policy
of the country.
In its review of the Court of Appeal decision, the Lithuanian Supreme
Court set forth the parties’ positions on the appeal, giving far more space
and focus to Lithuania’s position. Lithuania asserted that the arbitral award
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶¶ 27–31.
Id. ¶ 30.
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established a restraint from settling the dispute before a court, the ECJ does
not permit this to happen in litigation and should not permit it to happen in
arbitration, and “a contrary ruling would establish the supremacy of
arbitration over courts; this would disturb the balance of justice between
these two dispute settlement mechanisms.”151
The Supreme Court then elaborated the reasons it was referring legal
questions to the ECJ for a ruling. It was particularly seeking from the
international court a pronouncement on the proper relationship between the
Brussels I Regulation and the New York Convention.152 The court noted
that because of the supremacy of EU law “national courts must ensure the
full effectiveness of EU Regulations, and they must refuse to apply all
provisions of national law that are in conflict with this objective (in
principle, including the rules in international treaties binding the Member
State).”153 It therefore stated that a determination by the ECJ of the
relationship between the New York Convention and EU law was necessary
in order to properly decide this case and ensure that the Supreme
Court of Lithuania, in its interpretation and application of the law,
will not violate its duty as a national court to ensure the full
effectiveness of EU law, thus upholding the principle of the
supremacy of EU law.154
Because the New York Convention has been adopted by individual Member
States, but not by the European Union, whereas the Regulation is EU law,
the court is arguing that the Brussels I Regulation should take precedence
over the New York Convention. However, assuming the ECJ decides this
case after January 1, 2015 when the Recast becomes effective, it should be
clear that the reverse is true; the New York Convention takes precedence
over the Regulation.155
The Supreme Court also urged that an arbitral anti-suit injunction
should be subject to the Brussels I Regulation and prohibited by it.156 It
noted that according to established jurisprudence, a court-issued anti-suit
injunction was in violation of the Brussels I Regulation. According to the
Supreme Court, under a proper interpretation of the jurisprudence of the
ECJ, arbitral injunctions should be prohibited by the same Regulation
because

151
152
153
154
155
156
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Id. ¶¶ 62–69.
Id. ¶ 63.
Id. ¶ 69.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
Case Summaries, supra note 139, ¶ 80.
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[a] contrary interpretation would mean that dispute settlement in
arbitration would gain an advantage over dispute settlement in
national courts, because antisuit injunctions issued by courts may
not be recognized according to the rules of the Brussels I
Regulation and antisuit injunctions issued by arbitral tribunals
could limit the right of national courts to rule on their own
jurisdiction to examine a concrete case.157
Having made clear its position that the Brussels I Regulation should
govern arbitral anti-suit injunctions and prohibit them, the Lithuanian
Supreme Court then asked the ECJ to decide whether a Member State court
can refuse to recognize an arbitral award that amounts to an anti-suit
injunction which either orders a party (1) not to bring a case or (2) not to
bring certain claims in a case and (3) to decide whether refusal is proper
when the award restricts the right of a court to rule on its own
jurisdiction.158
The Lithuanian Supreme Court did not refer at any point to the Recast
Regulation generally or to its Recital 12. This is understandable because
the Recast does not apply until January 2015.159 However, it is likely that
the ECJ will take Recital 12 into consideration when it decides this case,
given that by the time the decision is rendered the Recast will most likely
be in effect and thus influence the ECJ’s decision. For example, the
Recital’s clear statement that the New York Convention takes precedence
over the Brussels I Regulation160 would appear to undermine the Lithuanian
157
158

Id.
Id. ¶¶ 81, 89. The full text of the three specific questions submitted to the ECJ is as follows:
1. Whether, if an arbitral tribunal issues an antisuit injunction by which it restricts a party
from bringing a case with certain claims before a court of a Member State, which, under
the rules of jurisdiction in the Brussels I Regulation, has jurisdiction to rule on the merits
of the civil case, the court of a Member State has the right to refuse to recognize such
arbitral award, because the award restricts the court’s right to determine itself whether it
has jurisdiction in the case under the rules of jurisdiction in the Brussels I Regulation;
2. In case the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, whether the same is true in
the case where the antisuit injunction issued by the arbitral tribunal orders a party to the
proceedings to restrict its claims in a case that is being examined in another Member
State, and the court of that Member State has jurisdiction to examine that case under the
rules of jurisdiction in the Brussels I Regulation . . .
3. Whether a national court seeking to ensure the supremacy of EU law and the full
effectiveness of the Brussels I Regulation may refuse to recognize an award by an arbitral
tribunal, if such award by the arbitral tribunal restricts the right of the national court to
rule on its jurisdiction and competence in a case that falls under the jurisdiction of the
Brussels I Regulation.

Id.
159
160

See Brussels Recast, supra note 7.
See id. art. 73(2); id. Recital 12, ¶ 3. As this Article was being finalized for publication,
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Supreme Court’s position concerning the supremacy of EU law and the
duty of a state court to ensure the full effectiveness of the Brussels I
Regulation, to the detriment of the New York Convention.
Moreover, the strong language in Recital 12 makes clear that
arbitration is excluded from the Recast Regulation, ancillary proceedings
involving arbitration are not governed by the Recast, parallel proceedings
can go forward in two venues, and the ruling of one court on the validity of
an arbitration agreement will not bind another court because preliminary
questions about arbitration are not subject to recognition and enforcement
under the Recast Regulation. All of these provisions undercut the
Lithuanian Supreme Court’s arguments that an arbitral anti-suit injunction
should be governed by the Brussels Regime.
Nonetheless, the ECJ may still find an argument for declaring the
arbitral anti-suit injunction improper. The reasoning could be based on the
similar effect that anti-suit injunctions have, whether issued by a court or an
arbitral tribunal. Court-issued anti-suit injunctions are prohibited because
they interfere with the power of another court to determine its own
jurisdiction, and arbitrator-issued injunctions have the same adverse impact
on the court. Arguably, the injunction issued by an arbitrator is effectively
a litigation maneuver to the extent that it affects a court’s power to rule on
its own jurisdiction in a litigated matter. In addition, even though labeled an
“award,” an arbitral anti-suit injunction is arguably not the kind of award
envisioned by the New York Convention.
Another approach that the ECJ could take would be to adopt the
Lithuanian courts’ view that an arbitral award that embodies an anti-suit
injunction restrains the court’s jurisdiction and thereby violates the public
policy of Lithuania. It would therefore not be enforceable under the New
York Convention Article V(2)(b).161 Whatever the ECJ may decide, its
Advocate General Wathelet delivered his opinion in “Gazprom” OAO. See Case C-536/13, Opinion of
Advocate General Wathelet in “Gazprom” OAO, CURIA (December 4, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=160309&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ
=first&part=1&cid=6477. The Advocate General’s opinion may or may not be followed by the ECJ.
However, it describes Recital 12 of the Recast as changing the landscape after West Tankers 2009,
finding that under the Recast the anti-suit injunction in that case would not be prohibited. Id. ¶¶ 132–34.
Advocate General Wathelet thus found that a prohibition of an anti-suit injunction granted by a court to
protect arbitration cannot be justified under the Recast. Moreover, the Advocate General stated that
even if the ECJ decided not to consider the Recast (which only becomes effective in January 2015), or
even if it disagreed with his interpretation, there was no reasonable way to apply the result in West
Tankers 2009 to prohibit anti-suit injunctions issued by an arbitral tribunal. Id. ¶ 153. Although the
Advocate General stated that the Supreme Court of Lithuania may have grounds under its own law to
deny enforcement of the arbitration award, he concluded that the Brussels I Regulation does not require
it “to refuse to recognize and enforce an anti-suit injunction issued by an arbitral tribunal.” Id. ¶¶ 143,
189. He further concluded that an award that contains an anti-suit injunction cannot for that reason be
refused enforcement under the New York Convention. Id. ¶ 189.
161
The ECJ might look for analogous reasoning in its prior case, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v.
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opinion in this case will likely provide important guidance for courts and
tribunals dealing with parallel proceedings in disputes that involve
arbitration.
In sum, the problems of parallel proceedings and the risk of
inconsistent judgments, which were a major concern of the EU Commission
and which prompted its 2010 Proposal for the Recast, remain problems
after the Recast. Yet the Recast has provided certain clarifications that will
contribute to providing some certainty as to aspects of the interface between
arbitration and cross-border litigation. First, a court first seised is
empowered to determine arbitrability for itself and (1) to make orders either
referring the parties to arbitration while staying or dismissing the litigation,
or (2) to decide that the arbitration is unenforceable and resolve the dispute
on the merits. If the court reaches the merits, its decision is subject to
enforcement under the Recast Regulation. Second, even if the first seised
court decides the arbitration agreement is invalid, the second seised court is
free to reach a different conclusion. Thus, a ruling on validity of the
arbitration agreement does not bind another court even if validity is
determined as an incidental question related to subject matter that is within
the Recast Regulation. This means a “torpedo action” cannot stop a court
that is second seised from ruling on the validity of the arbitration
agreement. Third, the New York Convention takes precedence over the
Recast Regulation with respect to the enforcement of inconsistent awards.
Fourth, ancillary procedures, such as appointment of arbitrators and
decisions on vacatur or enforcement, are outside the scope of the Recast.
Nonetheless, the devil is in the details, and, as will be discussed below,
many difficulties can arise that will not admit of any easy or obvious
solution.
IV. ARBITRATION’S FUTURE IN EUROPE AFTER THE
RECAST
Despite some welcome clarifications, the Recast does not solve the
thorny issue of how courts and tribunals will deal with the enforcement of
inconsistent judgments. Possible solutions might include the reinstatement
of the use of anti-suit injunctions by courts to stop a party that has agreed to
Benetton Int’l NV, in which it held that a Member State must grant an application for annulment if an
award is contrary to EU competition law even if the competition law claim had not been raised before
the arbitral tribunal. Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l NV, 1999 E.C.R. I3079. The violation of EU law would render the award against the national public policy of the Member
State. Id. The argument in Gazprom might be that EU law provides that anti-suit injunctions interfere
with court jurisdiction, so that such interference is equally violative whether it comes from a court or a
tribunal. However, the analogy would not be on all fours with ECO Swiss because in Gazprom there is
no EU law prohibiting anti-suit injunctions by arbitral tribunals, since arbitration is excluded from the
Brussels Recast.
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arbitrate from going forward with litigation. However, using anti-suit
injunctions to protect arbitration does not seem likely given the resistance
to this mechanism by the ECJ and by many policy makers in the civil law
system where the anti-suit injunction is effectively not in use. Nonetheless,
it may be that arbitrators, rather than courts, will undertake some form of
anti-suit injunction in order to protect the arbitral process. In any event,
there may be other methods going forward, outside of actions by courts and
legislatures, which can nudge the European Union toward more harmony
and uniformity in the interface between arbitration and litigation.
A. Problems Going Forward
Given the priority accorded to the New York Convention, it may not
be difficult for a court to decide whether to enforce an arbitral award or an
inconsistent court judgment when both come before it at the same time.
However, the timing will not always be so well coordinated. A court may
be asked to enforce a judgment when an arbitration award that is likely to
be inconsistent has not yet been handed down. Could the claimant, even
though no award has yet been issued, seek a partial final award from the
tribunal that the arbitration agreement is valid and then try to use that
partial final award as a way of blocking an inconsistent judgment in a
foreign court?
Another 2012 West Tankers decision (West Tankers 2012 Court of
Appeal), although not directly analogous, lends some credence to the above
scenario.162 In 2008, West Tankers had received an arbitral award in its
favor, declaring that it had no liability to the insurers.163 West Tankers then
sought and received leave to enforce the declaration of nonliability as a
judgment, and a judgment was entered against the insurers pursuant to
section 66(2) of the English Arbitration Act of 1996 (West Tankers
2011).164 The insurers then moved to set aside this order,165 arguing
primarily that a declaration of negative liability could not be enforced
because it was simply a declaration of the parties’ rights with no executory
aspect that required enforcement.166 However, both the English High Court
(Commercial Court)167 and the Court of Appeal168 upheld the order.169 Both
162

See West Tankers Inc. v. Allianz SPA & Anor, [2012] EWCA (Civ) 27 (Eng.).
See West Tankers Inc. v. Allianz SpA & Generali Assicurazione Generali, [2011] EWHC
(Comm) 829, ¶ 6 (Eng.) (referencing the award by Mr. Justice Field in the lower court decision).
164
See id. ¶¶ 1, 7.
165
See id. ¶ 1.
166
See id. ¶ 15.
167
See id. ¶ 32.
168
See West Tankers Inc. v. Allianz SPA & Anor, [2012] EWCA (Civ) 27, ¶¶ 39–41 (Eng.).
169
Although the court did not think that an award consisting of a declaration of rights, particularly a
163
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courts were persuaded by West Tankers’ argument that its award should be
enforceable as a judgment under the English Arbitration Act as “an
additional weapon in the Italian proceedings and/or a shield against
enforcement if those proceedings were to result in a judgment . . . that the
owners [West Tankers] were to blame for the collision.”170
West Tankers feared the insurers might obtain a favorable judgment in
Italy and then seek to have that judgment enforced in England pursuant to
the Brussels I Regulation. The Regulation provides that “[a] judgment
given in a Member State shall be recognized in the other Member States
without any special procedure being required.”171 However, it also
provides that a judgment shall not be recognized “if it is irreconcilable with
a judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the Member State
in which recognition is sought.”172 In the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice
Toulson appeared to believe that recognizing and enforcing the arbitral
award as a judgment under English law would protect West Tankers under
the Brussels I Regulation from the consequences of a potential enforcement
in England of an inconsistent judgment from the Italian court.173
Nonetheless, even though under section 66 of the English Arbitration
Act of 1996 an award may be “enforced in the same manner as a judgment
or order of the court to the same effect,”174 it is not clear that such a
judgment is entitled to be enforced as a Regulation judgment. In the West
Tankers 2011 case before the Commercial Court, the attorney for the
insurers cited the case of Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH v. Emilio Boch175 for
the proposition that an arbitration award enforced as a judgment was not a
Regulation judgment.
[T]o be a “judgment” for purposes of the [Brussels]
Convention,176 the decision must emanate from a judicial body of
declaration of negative rights (i.e., no liability) was always enforceable as a judgment, it found the facts
of this case supported enforcement. It cited with favor the lower court opinion of Mr. Justice Field who
had stated that
[w]here . . . as here, the victorious party’s objective in obtaining an order under s66 (1)
and (2) is to establish the primacy of a declaratory award over an inconsistent judgment,
the court will have jurisdiction to make a s66 order because to do so will be to make a
positive contribution to the securing of the material benefit of the award. Id. ¶ 14.
170
Id. ¶ 12.
171
Brussels I, supra note 1, art. 33 ¶ 1; Brussels Recast, supra note 7, art. 36 ¶ 1.
172
Brussels I, supra note 1, art. 34 ¶ 3; Brussels Recast, supra note 7, art. 45 ¶ 1(c).
173
After acknowledging West Tankers’ concerns, Lord Justice Toulson cited the Brussels I
Regulation’s prohibition on recognizing an inconsistent foreign judgment. See West Tankers Inc. v.
Allianz SPA & Anor, [2012] EWCA (Civ) 27, ¶ 13 (Eng.).
174
Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 66 (Eng.), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/
england.arbitration.act.1996/doc.html#1.
175
Case C-414/92, Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH v. Emilio Boch, 1994 E.C.R. 1-2237.
176
The Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
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a Contracting State deciding on its own authority on the issues
between the parties; accordingly, a settlement recorded in an
order of a court was not a judgment of the purposes of the
Convention.177
In other words, to qualify as a Brussels Convention (or Brussels I
Regulation) judgment, the judgment would have to be one that a court had
made in deciding the issues between the parties, not simply a recording of
what the parties (or tribunal) had done.178
Moreover, the Recast
Regulation’s complete exclusion of arbitration also casts doubt on whether
an arbitration award that is enforced as a judgment in a national court can
be treated as a judgment under the Recast. Certainly, according to Recital
12, paragraph 2, a decision by one court on the validity of an arbitration
agreement does not bind a court of another Member State.179 In addition,
paragraph 4 of Recital 12 states that “[t]his Regulation should not apply. . .
to any action or judgment concerning . . . recognition or enforcement of an
arbitral award.” Thus, the enforcement of an arbitral award as a judgment
would appear not to provide protection against an inconsistent foreign
judgment under the Recast Regulation.
Assuming an arbitration award cannot be transformed into a Recast
Regulation judgment by a national court, how much protection will it
receive via the New York Convention? As noted by Lord Justice Toulson,
West Tankers wanted its declaratory award to be enforced as a judgment to
serve both as a shield in England, against a potential inconsistent Italian
judgment, and as a sword in the Italian proceedings.180 Although the Recast
provides that the New York Convention will take precedence over the
Recast Regulation, if the insurers came to enforce an Italian judgment in
England against an existing arbitral award, the New York Convention
Commercial Matters 1968 was the predecessor of the Brussels I Regulation, which superseded the
Convention. See Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters (“Brussels I”), EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/
judicial_cooperation_in_civil_matters/l33054_en.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2014).
177
See West Tankers Inc v. Allianz SpA & Generali Assicurazione Generali, [2011] EWHC
(Comm) 829, ¶ 18 (Eng.).
178
In Effects of Foreign Judgments Relating to International Arbitral Awards: Is the ‘Judgment
Route’ the Wrong Road?, Maxi Scherer argues that a judgment on an arbitration award is different from
a court judgment because of its ancillary nature. That is, the award judgment relates to a prior
adjudication. Scherer, supra note 107, at 627–28. She notes that ‘[a]ccordingly, only the initial award
and not the ancillary award judgment should, in principle, be open to recognition or enforcement . . . .”
Id. at 628.
179
A ruling given by a court of a Member State as to whether or not an arbitration agreement is null
and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed should not be subject to the rules of recognition
and enforcement laid down in this Regulation regardless of whether the court decided on this as a
principal issue or as an incidental question. Brussels Recast, supra note 7, Recital 12, ¶ 2.
180
See West Tankers Inc. v. Allianz SPA & Anor, [2012] EWCA (Civ) 27, ¶ 12 (Eng.).
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would not apply. The Convention applies “to the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than
the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought
. . . .”181 In the West Tankers arbitration, the award was made in England
and the action to enforce it as a judgment was also in England, so its
enforcement there could only be under English law, not under the
Convention. Thus, if the award and an inconsistent judgment had come
before the English court at the same time, it could not be enforced under the
New York Convention because enforcement of the award was sought in the
same state where the award was made.
Moreover, it is likely that in many cases, as is true in West Tankers,
the court of the state where the award was made will be called upon to
protect an award made in its jurisdiction against an inconsistent foreign
judgment. Thus, it appears that the applicable law governing enforcement
of the arbitral award would be national law and not the New York
Convention or the Recast Regulation, since arbitration is excluded from the
Regulation. Therefore, the New York Convention could not serve as a
shield in England to protect an arbitral award made in England.182
The question then is whether an English court can protect such an
award under its national law and whether it can refuse to enforce a foreign
Member State judgment on the basis of its inconsistency with an arbitration
award, given that the Brussels Recast provides that such a judgment “shall
be recognized . . . without any special procedure being required.”183
181
New York Convention, supra note 4, art. I(1). The English Arbitration Act of 1996, section 100,
defines a New York Convention award as “an award made, in pursuance of an arbitration agreement, in
the territory of a state (other than the United Kingdom) which is a party to the New York Convention.”
Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 100 (Eng.). The situation is different in the United States, however,
based on its implementation of the second sentence of Article I(1) of the New York Convention, which
provides that the Convention “shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in
the State where there recognition and enforcement are sought.” New York Convention, supra note 4,
art. I(1). In the United States, implementing legislation in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) defines a
non-domestic award as one that “involves property located abroad, envisages performance or
enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.” 9 U.S.C.
§ 202 (2014); see Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997);
Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983).
182
Unlike in the United States, in most Contracting States to the New York Convention, the use of
the second criterion⎯applying the New York Convention to awards not considered as domestic awards
in the State where recognition is sought⎯“has remained a dead letter.” ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG,
THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958 22 (1981). According to Gary Born, “the
overwhelming tendency of national legislatures is to adopt a strictly territorial approach to arbitral
awards, treating any awards made on national territory as domestic (subject to local annulment actions),
and any awards made outside national territory as foreign/non-domestic (not subject to local annulment
actions, and instead protected by the Convention’s recognition requirements.)” BORN, supra note 79, at
2380–81.
183
Brussels Recast, supra note 7, art. 36, ¶ 1; Nielsen, supra note 7, at 591. One way for a Member
State court to give more protection to an arbitration award seated in its territory that also needed to be
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However, the New York Convention may be able to function as a
sword against an inconsistent judgment if it can be applied to obtain
enforcement of an award in a state other than the state where the award was
made. Whether the Italian court would recognize and enforce a negative
declaratory award under the Convention is not clear. Nor is it clear whether
a partial final award declaring that an arbitration agreement was valid
would be recognized and enforced under the New York Convention in a
foreign court and thereby prevent that court from finding the same
agreement to be invalid.
In West Tankers 2012, the English court’s recognition of the
declaratory award as a judgment came after there was a final award.
Although a partial final award would occur earlier in the arbitral
proceedings, there is no obvious reason why it should not be recognized
and enforced as an award in a foreign court under the New York
Convention.
However, the timing is important. As discussed above, a court that has
already declared an arbitration agreement invalid may be unlikely to
enforce an inconsistent award from another jurisdiction that would
undermine its own decision despite the priority of the New York
Convention. It would likely use a ground under the Convention such as
public policy to resist a decision in another Member State that was counter
to its own decision.184 If the court had not yet decided the question,
however, the New York Convention should require enforcement of the
partial final award on the arbitration agreement’s validity.
Finally, there is also the unresolved question of whether the complete
exclusion of “ancillary procedures” from the scope of the Recast Regulation
means that anti-suit injunctions are included within those procedures and

enforced in its territory would be to revive the notion of enforcement of a nondomestic award under the
New York Convention. Such an award, as in the United States, could be based on some international
connection or relationship, such as one or more of the parties being from a different country or the
subject matter of the dispute being international business or property. See Harry Ormsby, The Recast
Brussels Regulation and “Domestic” Arbitrations, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Dec. 9, 2014),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/12/09/the-recast-brussels-regulation-and-domesticarbitrations/ (stating that paragraph 3 of Recital 12 of the Recast, which provides that the New York
Convention has priority over the Recast, would be more useful in resolving conflicts between
enforcement of inconsistent awards and judgments if “domestic awards which are sufficiently
international in nature are able to be categorised as non-domestic awards for the purpose of the
Convention”).
184
See New York Convention, supra note 4, art. V(2) (“Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral
award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where the recognition and
enforcement is sought finds that . . . . The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to
the public policy of that country.”). Depending on the reason for a court’s finding of invalidity of the
arbitration agreement, the ground for refusal might also be Article V(2)(a), which provides for nonrecognition and non-enforcement if “[t]he subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement
by arbitration under the law of that country.” New York Convention, supra note 4, art. V(2)(a).
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therefore cannot be prohibited under the Recast. These and many other
questions will arise once the Recast Regulation becomes applicable to the
Member States in 2015.
B. Possible Solutions
1. What the Recast Accomplishes
By making clear that a decision of invalidity by a court first seised
does not stop either a second seised court or a tribunal in the second court’s
jurisdiction from going forward, the Recast can serve to deter some parties
who are simply filing a suit in order to harass or delay. In addition,
assuming the ECJ does not overturn decisions such as that of the English
High Court holding in West Tankers 2012 that tribunals can award both
damages for breach of an arbitration clause and an indemnity, these
potential remedies might dissuade parties from initiating vexatious parallel
proceedings.
There is also the possibility of using anti-suit injunctions to stop
parallel proceedings. It is probably unlikely that court-issued anti-suit
injunctions will be reinstated after the Brussels Recast (even though they
might arguably be considered “ancillary proceedings” outside the scope of
the Recast). Nonetheless, arbitral tribunals may well issue orders for the
purpose of preventing “prejudice to the arbitral process itself” under rules
such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or under the UNCITRAL Model
Law185 unless the ECJ rules otherwise.
The value of an arbitral order that would function like an anti-suit
injunction should be considered in light of the harm that can be caused by a
parallel proceeding that is initiated in bad faith for the purpose of delay and
harassment. The purpose of UNCITRAL Rule 26(2)(b) is to provide a
tribunal with a way of controlling against conduct that would undermine the
arbitral process. International arbitrators, who are generally chosen because
they are believed to be fair-minded, independent, and impartial, should be
entitled to be trusted not to use such measures often or indiscriminately.
Because the New York Convention does not prevent parallel proceedings,
this vulnerability to abuse could and should be shored up by a mechanism
such as an anti-suit injunction. Even lawyers trained in the civil law
tradition find that there are times when an anti-suit injunction should be
issued by an arbitral tribunal to protect the integrity and effectiveness of the
arbitral process.186 An anti-suit injunction can accomplish this, particularly
185

See UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 118, art. 26 (2)(b); see UNCITRAL MODEL
LAW 2006, supra note 118, art. 17(2)(b).
186
See, e.g., Gaillard, supra note 117, at 264 (“[A]ntisuit injunctions may . . . have an edifying
effect, that of reminding the parties of their voluntary acceptance of international arbitration for the
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if backed by the possibility that the tribunal could ultimately award
damages if the litigating party did not withdraw its suit.
The counter argument is that sometimes the initiation of a parallel
proceeding is not commenced simply as a tactic to delay but rather because
the party has a legitimate claim that it never was a party to the alleged
arbitration agreement. Thus, such a party would maintain that it should not
be barred from pursuing its claim in court by the potential imposition of a
damages claim by the tribunal if it goes forward. However, in considering
the two different motivations⎯delay versus legitimate claim⎯the goals of
efficiency and speed would certainly push toward the legitimate claim
being presented in the arbitration proceeding. In many instances, if the
tribunal rejects a challenge to its jurisdiction, that claim will be reviewed by
a court.187 Moreover, the tribunal itself may well decide that there is no
valid arbitration agreement. On balance, an order by the tribunal to a party
to cease litigation in another jurisdiction would seem more likely to deter
harassing litigation than to undermine a legitimate claim.
Although the Recast has provided a number of helpful clarifications,
more steps can still be taken to deal with the remaining problems. The next
section will consider some possible ways of developing a more uniform and
predictable interface between arbitration and litigation.
2. What Remains to be Done
The forces at work in the last few years on whether and to what extent
the Brussels I Regulation should impact international arbitration appear to
have grown out of the inherent tensions between national law, regional
(EU) law, and international law. In the struggle over whether arbitration
should come within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation, those favoring a
national law approach and those favoring an international law approach
ultimately found common ground. That common ground was to continue to
exclude arbitration from the Brussels I Regulation.188 The Member States
preferred the autonomy to apply their own national law rather than some
attempted harmonization by the European Union. One might think that
resolution of their dispute, and protecting the integrity of the arbitral process.”); Lévy, supra note 120, at
123 (“[A]rbitrators should not refrain from issuing anti-suit injunctions where such measures appear
necessary to protect the arbitral proceedings.”).
187
See, e.g., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 1985, supra note 76, art. 16(3) (“If the arbitral tribunal rules
as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, any party may request, within thirty days after having
received notice of that ruling, the court specified in article 6 to decide the matter, which decision shall
be subject to no appeal . . . .”).
188
The reason that arbitration was excluded from the original Brussels Convention in 1968 was
because it was believed that the New York Convention and the 1961 European Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration already sufficiently regulated international commercial arbitration.
See Radicati di Brozolo, supra note 18, at 425.
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those favoring an international approach would not support the Member
States’ application of their own law to international arbitration.189
However, what seemed to be the concern of many internationalists was that
more regional control of arbitration of any kind through regulation would
limit the flexible rules in some Member States. That flexibility has
permitted competition between legal systems in different Member States
and provided broad freedom and autonomy in matters of arbitration.190
There is, however, a certain inevitability that there will and there should be
a further harmonization of laws affecting arbitration. Commentators have
pointed out that already Member State laws on arbitration are affected by
EU law.191 Public policy decisions by arbitrators in individual Member
States are impacted by EU policy.192 Moreover, in the EU there are existing
legal provisions outside of the Recast Brussels Regulation that relate to
arbitration.193 Professor Massimo Benedettelli has listed these areas where
there is room for further harmonization of arbitration law: subject matter
arbitrability, permitting arbitrators to seek preliminary rulings from the ECJ
as to the proper interpretation of EU Treaties and EU legislation, “creat[ing]
a new ground of exclusive jurisdiction . . . under the . . . competence of the
State of the seat of the arbitration,”194 and “recognition and enforcement of
judgments and awards.”195
189
Of course, the international arbitration community is not monolithic, and many favored the EU
Commission 2010 Proposal. See supra text accompanying notes 71–77.
190
See Radicati di Brozolo, supra note 18, at 424–25.
191
See, e.g., Allen B. Green & Josh Weiss, Public Policy and International Arbitration in The
European Union, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 661, 666–68 (2011) (discussing Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss
China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l NV, 1999 E.C.R. 1-03055, in which the ECJ held that a Member State
must grant an application for annulment if an award was contrary to EU competition law even if the
competition law claim had not been raised before the arbitral tribunal).
192
See, e.g., Maud Piers, How EU Law Affects Arbitration and The Treatment of Consumer
Disputes: The Belgian Example, 59-JAN DISP. RESOL. J., 76, 79 (2005) (“Belgian case law and
jurisprudence generally accept that arbitrators have a duty to raise public policy issues on their own
initiative. This is consistent with the arbitrator’s duty to the parties to issue an enforceable award. An
arbitral award that violates a directly applicable public policy could be set aside or not enforced. Were it
otherwise, parties could choose arbitration to evade EC-public policy-based rules.”)
193
See, e.g., Benedettelli, supra note 18, at 585, 592 (“Starting with a decision in 1992 in the case
of Elf Aquitaine-Thyssen/Minol, the EU Commission has required the settlement by arbitration of
private disputes arising in connection with alleged breaches of those behavioral or structural measures
which the Commission may impose when granting conditional merger clearances under Articles, 6,
paragraph 1, lit. (b) and 8, paragraph 2, lit. (b), Reg. (EC) no. 139/2004.” (citations omitted)).
194
Benedettelli, supra note 18, at 615. The United States has developed to some extent a doctrine of
preference for the jurisdiction of the seat of arbitration, using the concepts of “primary jurisdiction” for
the court of the seat and “secondary jurisdiction” for other courts. See, e.g., Karaha Bodas Co. v.
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak, 364 F.3d 274, 287 (5th Cir. 2004).
195
Benedettelli, supra note 18, at 616; see also Benedettelli, supra note 18, at 613–19. In the
European Union, one possible avenue of harmonization might be for the European Union itself to adopt
the UNCITRAL Model Law and require Member States to adopt it or conform their laws to it. A
number of Member States have already adopted a version of this law, which is a very highly regarded
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In the meantime, however, the problem not resolved by the Recast—
that arbitration and litigation of the same issues can proceed simultaneously
with the high risk of inconsistent awards (i.e., the issues of parallel
proceedings)—is a global problem, not merely a European regional
problem.196 Lack of a global solution or even a reasonably harmonized
approach to the problem undermines predictability and therefore confidence
in the arbitration process. Even the process in Europe will not be uniform
because courts in EU countries where the mechanism is available can
continue to issue anti-suit injunctions against a party who has brought a
lawsuit in a non-Member State in breach of an arbitration agreement. NonEU countries, such as the United States and Singapore, will also in certain
circumstances issue anti-suit injunctions. Having a global consensus on
how best to avoid parallel proceedings in violation of an arbitration
agreement would help support the fundamental objective of the New York
Convention to enforce arbitration agreements.
One approach toward harmonization could be to give more deference
to the court of the seat. This would have been one result of the Commission
Proposal discussed earlier.197 The idea has already been developed in the
United States and elsewhere to some extent by means of the concept of
“primary” and “secondary” jurisdiction.198 The concept derives from a
reading of the New York Convention that gives preferential status to the
court of the seat with respect to procedural matters (Article V(1)(d)) and to
the setting aside of awards (Article V(1)(e)).199 “Primary” jurisdiction is
said to belong to the court with the jurisdiction to annul or set aside an
award while “secondary” jurisdiction is that of other courts.200 Encouraging
lex arbitri; it has been adopted in sixty-seven countries. See Status UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note
106. However, there would likely be strong resistance from countries like England and France who are
quite predisposed to their own laws.
196
See, e.g., Grace Gunah Kim, Note, After the ECJ’s West Tankers: The Clash of Civilizations on
the Issue of an Anti-Suit Injunction, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 573, 603 (2011); Andrew Pullen,
The Future of International Arbitration in Europe: West Tankers and the EU Green Paper, 12 INT’L
ARB. L. REV. 56, 61 (2009).
197
See supra text accompanying notes 68–71.
198
See Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d at 297–310.
199
See W. Michael Reisman & Heide Iravani, Symposium, The Changing Relation of National
Courts and International Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 5, 12–17 (2010) (“[T]he
Convention establishes two tiers of review competence, making a sharp distinction between so-called
‘primary’ or ‘venue’ jurisdictions and ‘secondary’ or ‘enforcement’ jurisdictions.”). This view of
primary and secondary jurisdiction with respect to vacatur and enforcement of awards has been
criticized by commentators who believe the annulment of an award at the seat is not necessarily
preclusive of the possibility of enforcement in other countries. See, e.g., Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo,
The Enforcement of Annulled Awards: Further Reflections in Light of Thai-Lao Lignite, 25 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 47 (2014); Marc J. Goldstein, Annulled Awards in the U.S. Courts: How Primary is
“Primary Jurisdiction?,” 25 AMER. REV. INT’L ARB. 19 (2014).
200
See Reisman & Iravani, supra note 199, at 12; see also Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L.
v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1997); CHRISTOPHER DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE
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an international perspective that broadens the concept to include the court at
the seat of arbitration as having primary jurisdiction under Article II of the
Convention on the question of the validity of the arbitration agreement
could contribute to a more harmonized approach to parallel proceedings
occurring between a court and a tribunal.
In considering any potential areas of harmonization, however, a
cautionary note is in order: based on the resistance shown to EU regulation
of arbitration in the run-up to the Recast Regulation, further attempts at
harmonization of arbitration laws and rules in the European Union should
not stray far from existing international standards and practice and should
maintain to the greatest extent possible the autonomy of private parties.
There should be significant flexibility in fixing the balance among EU
Rules, national rules, and rules chosen by the parties.
There are, however, a number of ways that arbitration practice could
be nudged toward uniformity of practice rather than harmonization of laws.
Soft law instruments such as the IBA Rules on Taking of Evidence have
already created a widely acceptable approach for taking evidence in
arbitration hearings that is a hybrid of common law and civil law.201 The
IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitration
(adopted May 25, 2013), although somewhat controversial and not yet
widely in use, reflect international concerns over different ethical standards
applicable to arbitration counsel from different jurisdictions.202 Other soft
law instruments could be created that would encourage but not require their

ARBITRATION 682 (2011) (“The New York Convention provides a carefully structured framework for
the review and enforcement of international arbitral awards. Only a court in a country with primary
jurisdiction over an arbitral award may annul that award. Courts in other countries have secondary
jurisdiction; a court in a country with secondary jurisdiction is limited to deciding whether the award
may be enforced in that country. The Convention mandates very different regimes for the review of
arbitral awards (1) in the countries in which, or under the law of which, the award was made, and (2) in
other countries where recognition and enforcement are sought. Under the Convention, the country in
which, or under the arbitration law of which, an award was made is said to have primary jurisdiction
over the arbitration award. All other signatory states are secondary jurisdictions, in which parties can
only contest whether that state should enforce the arbitral award.”).
201
See Timo Ylikantola, Document Discovery in Current International Arbitration Practice: Are
There Differences Between Common Law and Civil Law Traditions?, 16 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L.
& BUS. 123, 131 (2012) (“One of the main purposes of the IBA Rules of Evidence is to provide an
efficient, economical and fair process, especially to parties who are from different legal cultures.
Therefore, the IBA Rules of Evidence reflect procedures in use in many different legal systems and they
are designed to be used in connection with or to supplement institutional, ad hoc or other rules or
procedures governing international arbitrations.”).
202
At the IBA’s 17th Annual International Arbitration Day in February 2014, delegates noted that
arbitrators come from different legal cultures and that “there is a current compelling need for the
development of a code of ethics in international arbitration and for the adaptation of tribunals and
institutions to the adoption of such a code.” Sam Chadderton, Arbitration: What Does the Future
Hold?, 68 IBA GLOBAL INSIGHT 49, 50–51 (2014).
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adoption by the parties.203 Such instruments could be created by private
groups and organizations, such as UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT, or the IBA.
Another potentially influential private group is the European Law Institute
(ELI), created in 2011 and modeled in part after the American Law Institute
in the United States.204 According to a European Commission Press
Release in 2011, the ELI will “identify possible solutions to help improve
the application of EU law, and develop suggestions for reforms of EU
legislation in all areas.”205 Thus, the ELI could provide a framework for
examining the application of arbitration laws and play an important role in
developing solutions and suggesting reforms.
One possible model for achieving flexibility while encouraging more
harmonization is the proposed Regulation on a Common European Sales
Law (CESL).206 Proposed in 2011,207 the CESL remains controversial, but
there are elements in its structure that might be profitably used in an
arbitration context. If adopted, the CESL would provide a harmonized
contract law regime within the national law of a Member State.208 It would
apply only when the parties opted to use it. If the parties chose it, however,
the national contract law would not apply, unless some aspect of contract
law was not covered by the CESL.209 In addition, the CESL could be
chosen when one of the parties was from a third country, if the other party
was from a Member State.210
If a similar concept to CESL were developed for arbitration law, it
would permit parties a choice between two laws: either the Member State’s
law at the seat or the regional arbitration regime. Having an optional
arbitration regime would permit a Member State to keep its original
arbitration law, but the State might be inspired to modify that law if it found
that most parties were choosing the alternate arbitration regime. Moreover,
the option of a regional arbitration regime might ultimately lead to a
203

See generally INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND SOFT LAW (Andrea K. Bjorklund and
August Reinisch eds., 2012) (containing interesting perspectives on the role of soft law instruments in
international investment law).
204
Press Release, European Comm’n, European Commission Welcomes Foundation of the
European Law Institute (June 1, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11666_en.htm.
205
Id.
206
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common
European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final (Oct. 11, 2011) [hereinafter CESL].
207
Id.
208
See id. at 6. Despite opposition from Germany and the United Kingdom, the CESL appears on
path to adoption. See European Parliament votes for Common European Sales Law, OUT-LAW.COM
(Feb.
27
2014),
http://www.out-law.com/articles/2014/february/european-parliament-votes-forcommon-european-sales-law/. Parliament voted in favor of the law on February 26, 2014. Id. The next
step would be adoption by the European Council of Ministers, which would cause it to become law. Id.
209
See CESL, supra note 206, at 6.
210
See id. at 7.
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broader international consensus on parallel proceedings between arbitration
and litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
In the Explanatory Memorandum to its 2010 Proposal on Brussels I,
the EU Commission explained its concern about the interface between
arbitration and litigation.
[B]y challenging an arbitration agreement before a court, a party
may effectively undermine the arbitration agreement and create a
situation of inefficient parallel court proceedings which may lead
to irreconcilable resolutions of the dispute. This leads to
additional costs and delays, undermines the predictability of
dispute resolution and creates incentives for abusive litigation
tactics.211
The Commission Proposal of a lis pendens rule within the Recast
Brussels Regulation that would have given a jurisdictional preference to the
court or the tribunal of the seat seemed to be a reasonable solution to the
problem of parallel proceedings. However, it would have ended the
exclusion of arbitration from the Recast Brussels Regulation and might
have potentially led to other court decisions like West Tankers 2009 that
could blur the lines between the Regulation’s application to litigation and to
arbitration. The rejection of the Commission Proposal by the Parliament
and the Council leaves the parallel proceedings issue unresolved, although
some clarification was achieved. The statement that precedence is to be
given to the New York Convention over the Recast Regulation was a
helpful step although it is not altogether clear how this will work in
practice. Other provisions from Recital 12 also bring needed clarity. A
second seised court can reach a different conclusion about an arbitration
agreement’s validity, and the ruling of the first court will not be binding on
the second court. However, decisions about enforcement when there is a
judgment that is inconsistent with an arbitral award will not be easy to
implement in a fair and reasonable way.
More work needs to be done to create a predictable and transparent
interface between arbitration and cross-border litigation, which should be
the focus of private international law organizations and groups. If the
camel’s nose is not going to be permitted under the tent, then nonetheless a
way must be found for the tent dweller and the camel to work together for
their mutual benefit.
211

Commission Proposal, supra note 70, Explanatory Memorandum, § 1.2.
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